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The Semisecret Life of Late Mao-Era
International Law Scholarship
By James D. Fry* & Huang Yining**

I. Introduction
The late University of Maryland law professor Hungdah
Chiu wrote in 1987 that “no scholarly writings on international
law were published in the People’s Republic of China” between
1965 and 1979.1 This period often is referred to as the Cultural
Revolution, which occurred during the latter half of the Mao era
when the PRC’s founder Chairman Mao Zedong took back
control over the Communist Party of China from the corrupting
influences of experts and placed emphasis on the proletariat
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Hong Kong Faculty of Law.
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1. Hungdah Chiu, Chinese Attitudes Towards International Law in the
Post-Mao Era, 1978-1987, 21 INT’L LAW. 1127, 1127 (1987), reprinted in 7
CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 399 (1988); see also Hungdah Chiu,
Communist China’s Attitude Toward International Law, 60 AM. J. INT’L L. 245,
266–67 (1966) (stating “[many writers in Communist China] all deny the
existence of a common science of international law. . . . The science of
international law in Communist China is still in a very primitive stage. Its
contribution to this science, if any, is mainly in the field of compiling or editing
documents.”) [hereinafter Communist China’s Attitude]; Detlev Vagts &
Hungdah Chiu, A Concise Introduction to the New Areas of International Law,
82 AM. J. INT’L L. 892, 893 (1988) (alluding to the same assertion). By
“international law,” this Article means public international law, not private
international law or international economic law, even though a broader
definition of this phrase obviously would include these other aspects.
*
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masses and on Mao himself. Chiu’s assertion seems intuitively
correct because it is no mystery that the PRC largely limited its
international law-making efforts during this period,2 and it
seems predictable that PRC international law scholarship would
follow this pattern. Nevertheless, Chiu’s definitive assertion
essentially dares readers to prove him wrong. Where other U.S.based international law scholars have preferred to follow
instinctively,3 this Article began as a direct—although
somewhat playful—response to that dare. While an extensive
review of Chinese literature and English translations of that
literature uncovered only one clearly scholarly piece from that
time period, these U.S.-based commentators nevertheless were
wrong to overlook it. The reference to “semisecret” in this
Article’s title is an acknowledgement that contemporary
Chinese scholars and institutions are fully aware of this
scholarly piece, as its author Zhou Gengsheng is well respected
and much discussed in Chinese circles for his unique
contributions to international law, in addition to his
contribution to the socialist legal system with his emphasis on
classism. This Article identifies, analyzes and evaluates this
Mao-era literature with an eye towards determining its
scholarly significance, mainly for the benefit of a Western
audience who lacks knowledge of this particular literature, in
the hopes that future English-language studies can pay greater
attention to the literature from this period and its impact on the
PRC’s progress in the realm of international law.4 This Article
2. It is almost amusing how Rhode and Whitlock’s book about PRC
treaties concluded between 1949 and 1978 mentions no treaties between 1965
and 1978. See GRANT F. RHODE & REID E. WHITLOCK, TREATIES OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1978: AN ANNOTATED COMPILATION 43 (1980) (listing
the last treaty of the PRC from this period as one with Tanzania, which was
signed on February 20, 1965).
3. See, e.g., MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 81
n.144 (4th ed., 2003); Michael Bennett, The People’s Republic of China and the
Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Disputes, 28 STAN. J. INT’L L.
425, 443 (1992); James V. Feinerman, Chinese Participation in the
International Legal Order, 141 CHINA Q. 186, 186 (1995); Samuel S. Kim, The
Development of International Law in Post-Mao China, 1 J. CHINESE L. 117, 117
(1987); Benjamin O. Kostrzewa, China International Economic Trade
Arbitration Commission in 2006: New Rules, Same Results?, 15 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 519, 523 (2006).
4. See Tilmann Altwicker & Oliver Diggelmann, How is Progress
Constructed in International Legal Scholarship?, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 425, 443–
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also joins with Wuhan University and other PRC institutions in
commemorating Zhou Gengsheng’s 130th posthumous birthday.
This Article is delimited by a focus on international law
scholarship during the late Mao era, not on the PRC’s actual
approach to or pronouncements on international law, mainly in
order to respond directly to the assertion of U.S.-based
international law scholars on late Mao-era scholarship. Of
course, considerable ambiguity surrounds what constitutes
scholarly work; no legal or even consensus definition generally
exists. To be clear, definitions might exist in specific contexts
such as the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”) of the
United States, which prohibits foreign lobbying except for “bonafide religious, scholastic, academic or scientific pursuits or the
fine arts,” inter alia, although the distinction between scholarly
and other types of activities is left entirely ambiguous under the
legislation and the case law.5 In this particular context, Chiu
signaled in 1966 what he might have meant by scholarly when
he added the qualification to similar assertions from the past
that Mao-era international law commentators exhibited “a lack
of interest in original studies of international law problems,” 6
suggesting that his definition of scholarly requires an element of
originality and intellectual rigor concerning clearly identified
problems. Whether the plain-language definition of scholarly
contains such elements depends on which dictionary one
consults. The Oxford English Dictionary refers to “learned,
erudite” for its definition.7 The Cambridge English Dictionary
defines scholarly as “containing a serious, detailed study of a
subject,”8 which suggests the same type of study that a learned
44 (2014) (noting how past perspectives on international law are important
inasmuch as they have helped form current perspectives).
5. Foreign Agents Registration Act, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (1938), amended
by 22 U.S.C. § 613(e) (emphasis added). See generally Control of Communist
Activities, 1 STAN. L. REV. 85 (1948); Murray L. Schwartz & James C. N. Paul,
Foreign Communist Propaganda in the Mails: A Report on Some Problems of
Federal Censorship, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 621 (1959); The Swampy Business of
Lobbying for Foreign Governments, ECONOMIST (Sept. 22, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2018/09/22/the-swampy-business-oflobbying-for-foreign-governments.
6. Communist China’s Attitude, supra note 1, at 267.
7. Scholarly, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Ent
ry/172492 (last visited June 4, 2019).
8. Scholarly, CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.cambridg
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or erudite person would undertake. As this Article looks at U.S.based international law scholars, it might be helpful to look at
U.S. dictionaries. The Merriam-Webster dictionary provides a
similar definition as that of the Oxford English Dictionary— “of,
characteristic of, or suitable to learned persons.”9 Collins
Dictionary provides a first definition of “learned” and then a
second of “having or showing much knowledge, accuracy, and
critical ability.”10 Of course, accuracy might depend on the
viewer’s perspective and the referent employed. Regardless, an
amalgam of these definitions would include a large measure of
detailed knowledge and serious independence in expressing that
detailed knowledge, which presumably would create some form
of originality in addressing the problem at issue. This Article
uses all three elements—knowledge, independence and
originality—to assess whether a particular Mao-era work
between 1965 and 1979 represents a scholarly contribution. This
is distinguished from non-scholarly contributions, which may
relate to education but more closely resemble indoctrination and
political propaganda.11
Critics will emphasize that independent research was not
possible during the Mao era, and so no scholarly work could have
been produced. Indeed, the Thought Reform campaigns between
1949 to 1956, the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1957, the Great
Leap Forward between 1958 to 1962, and the Cultural
e.org/dictionary/english/scholarly (last visited June 4, 2019).
9.
Scholarly, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/scholarly (last visited June 4, 2019).
10. Scholarly, COLLINS DICTIONARY, www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionar
y/english/scholarly (last visited June 4, 2019).
11. To be clear, Mao emphasized education during the Cultural
Revolution. See, e.g., Mao Tse-Tung: The People’s Emperor, in MAKERS OF
WORLD HISTORY 244, 247-49 (J. Kelley Sowards ed., 2d ed. 1995) (three of the
seven directives by Mao related to education, with the second emphasizing the
importance of science and engineering at China’s universities, the fourth
underlining the key role of workers in embedding proletariat values within
China’s education system, and the sixth highlighting the need for youth to be
educated by peasants in the countryside). While Mao seems to have opposed
the type of critical thinking that forms the bedrock of modern liberal education,
he nonetheless saw a type of education—something Western scholars might
see as akin to indoctrination—as being central to his overarching vision for the
PRC. Regardless, this Article distinguishes such an emphasis on education
from genuinely scholarly endeavors that are based on knowledge,
independence and originality.
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Revolution between 1966 to 1976 all essentially devastated
academic and intellectual freedom, to put it mildly.12 Was it
possible to produce scholarly works without a robust legal
academy? Was it even possible to be scholarly, in particular,
independent, when the threat of re-education camps or worse
loomed in the minds of commentators at that time? Despite
these valid questions, the research results contained in this
Article suggest that at least one Mao-era commentator—Zhou
Gengsheng—exhibited sufficient knowledge, independence and
originality when describing and analyzing the international
legal system, beyond being a mere propaganda tool, to constitute
scholarly work. If one can tolerate a lesser degree of originality,
the number of scholarly works from this period would increase.
The lesser degree of originality comes not in the form of copying,
as some commentators assert,13 but in the form of commentaries
and glossaries accompanying compilations of primary sources of
international law, as with Wang Tieya’s Materials on the Law of
the Sea.14 Despite such potential flexibility with originality,
independence must remain intact or else the line between
scholarship and propaganda becomes blurred beyond
recognition. This stricter requirement for independence means
12. See generally PATRICIA BUCKLEY EBREY, THE CAMBRIDGE ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY OF CHINA 305–08 (2010); ANDREW G. WALDER, CHINA UNDER MAO: A
REVOLUTION DERAILED 124, 135–37, 140, 142 180–81, 185–88, 267–68 (2015);
Ronald St. John MacDonald, Wang Tieya: Persevering in Adversity and
Shaping the Future of Public International Law in China, introduction to
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA 1, 15–21 (Ronald St. John MacDonald ed.
1994) (discussing these events from the perspective of Wang Tieya); Stephen
Minas, “Kill Fewer, Kill Carefully”: An Analysis of the 2006 to 2007 Death
Penalty Reforms in China, 27 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 36, 47–48 (2009).
13. See He Qinhua, China’s Transplantation of Soviet International Law
after the 1950s [中国对苏联国际法的移植], 2 JINLING L. REV. [金陵法律评论], 89
(2001). The fact that Mao-era scholarship and contemporary Western sources
were produced in different languages frustrates efforts to definitively
determine the existence of copying using such software as Turnitin.
Nevertheless, a comparison of Chinese and U.S. international law scholarship
from roughly this time period, especially tables of contents and the structural
arrangement of arguments, provides no evidence of copying. Perhaps future
tools will be more effective at detecting such types of copying.
14. See Li Yu-min, An Analysis on the Fundamental Form of the Sinoforeign Treaty Relationship in Late Qing Dynasty [北京大学法律系国际法教研室
], SHI LIN [史林] (2016); Chen Huiqing, China and the Convention on the Law
of the Sea: Historical Review,Experiences and Lessons [海洋法资料汇编] 3
WUHAN UNIV. INT’L L. REV. (2017); PEOPLE’S PUBLISHING HOUSE [人民出版社]
(1974) [hereinafter Wang’s Materials on the Law of the Sea].
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that the work of Mao-era officials must be excluded from this
study, even when that work may have reflected some elements
of originality and serious knowledge of international law, such
as Mao’s own writings on international law.15 While U.S.-based
international law scholars generally were correct in describing
the Mao-era PRC’s distrust of international law as an
imperialist tool,16 which also would be an apt description of the
Soviet view of international law at this time,17 this does not
mean that no one within the PRC between 1965 and 1979 wrote
about international law from a scholarly perspective. This
Article analyzes and evaluates that literature to show that at
least some PRC international law scholarship was created
during the time period in question.
II. Research Methodology
A thorough review of Chinese literature and English
translations of that literature reveals a relatively significant
body of Mao-era international law scholarship, at least
compared to how U.S.-based scholars have described this period
in the past. This Part identifies that literature. Before doing so,
however, a few words must be said about this Article’s
methodology. The research for the Article began from broad
archival research, including official documents, newspapers,
magazine articles and academic publications produced in the
PRC from 1965 to 1979, as well as English translations of these
15. See, e.g., ZEDONG MAO, On Coalition Government, in SELECTED WORKS
MAO TSE-TUNG 119–25 (1945) (outlining the CPC’s approach to
international law); ZEDONG MAO, On the Outrages by British Warships:
Statement by the Spokesman of the General Headquarters of the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army, in IV SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 1349–51
(Renmin Univ. ed. 1949).
16. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 3, at 442–43; Jacques deLisle, China’s
Approach to International Law: A Historical Perspective, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 267, 272–73 (2000).
17. See generally KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1970); G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (William E. Butler
trans. 1974); Kazimierz Grzybowski, Soviet Theory of International Law for the
Seventies, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 862 (1983). Please note that the purpose of this
Article is not to compare Soviet and PRC approaches or Western and PRC
approaches to international law. The occasional comparisons in this Article
between Zhou’s book and Western international law textbooks is intended to
be illustrative, not exhaustive.
OF

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/10

6

ARTICLE 10_FRY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

8/23/2019 6:47 PM

MAO-ERA INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP

997

types of materials, with the aim of uncovering absolutely all
international law scholarship and references to such scholarship
from this period. There were three stages to this archival
research. This research began with electronic searches for
references to guojifa (国际法 or international law) and to guoji
gongfa (国际公法 or public international law) in two databases:
the China Academic Journals Full-text Database (“CAJ”) (中国
期刊全文数据库 or Zhongguo Qikan Quanwen Shujuku) from the
China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database (“CNKI”) (中国
知识基础设施工程, 中国知网, Zhongguo Zhishi Jichu Sheshi
Gongcheng or Zhongguo Zhiwang), and The People’s Data (人民
数据库 or Renmin Sujuku), which returned articles from Renmin
Ribao (人民日报 or The People’s Daily), Ta-Kung Pao (大公报 or
The Impartial Daily) and Xinhuashe (新华社 or The Xinhua
News Agency), among others.
These searches returned
thousands of articles, seven of which were seen as potentially
containing or referring to the type of knowledgeable,
independent and original work that one would expect of truly
scholarly writings, and all of them were authored by the famous
international law scholar Wang Tieya. Given Wang Tieya’s
unequivocal expertise in international law,18 it originally was
hoped that these newspaper articles relating to the United
Nations and appearing in the The People’s Daily and Beijing’s
Impartial Daily (or Ta-Kung Pao) between 1965 and 1967 would
be sufficiently scholarly to be included in this study. However,
they ultimately did not make it into this Article because of their
overwhelmingly propagandistic and ideological tone, which is
reflected in their titles:
−
−

The United Nations is a Tool of Aggression of
the US Imperialists19;
Superstitious Beliefs Concerning the United
Nations Must be Discarded20;

18. See generally MacDonald, supra note 12; Wang Tieya, International
Law in China: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 221 REC. DES COURS
195 (1990-II); Dorothee de Sampayo & Garrido-Nijgh, Judge Wang: Citizen of
the World, 4 J. HIST. INT’L L. 238 (2002).
19. Wang Tieya [王铁崖], The United Nations is a Tool of Aggression by
U.S. Imperialists [联合国是美帝国主义的侵略工具], IMPARTIAL DAILY [TA-KUNG
PAO], Jan. 9, 1965, at 4.
20. Wang Tieya [王铁崖], Superstitious Beliefs Concerning the United
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Look! What a Mess the United Nations has
Become21;
The United Nations Must Undergo a Thorough
Re-organization22;
The Fundamental Problem of the United
Nations is to Break U.S. Control23;
China Asks for Nothing from the United
Nations24; and
An Ugly Drama in the United Nations.25

A detailed analysis of the content of each confirmed this initial
impression. The other results from the searches of these
databases similarly lacked the requisite knowledge,
independence and originality. Representative pieces of this
group would include Hsiang-Yang Chi’s article Smash the New
Tsars’ Theory of ‘Limited Sovereignty,’ which was translated into
English,26 or Zhu Fu’s article Rusk’s ‘International Law’ Cannot
Conceal the Crime of Aggression against Vietnam by American
Imperialism,27 not to mention myriad articles relating to the
transfer of the U.N. seat to the PRC and border disputes with
the Soviet Union, among many other international disputes. All
Nations Must be Discarded [必须破除对联合国的迷信], IMPARTIAL DAILY [TAKUNG PAO], Jan. 10, 1965, p. 1 [hereinafter Superstitious Beliefs].
21. Wang Tieya [王铁崖], Look! What a Mess the United Nations has
Become [看，联合国还象个什么样子], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Feb. 25, 1965
[hereinafter Look!].
22. Wang Tieya [王铁崖], The United Nations Must Undergo a Thorough
Re-Organization [联合国必须彻底改组], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], June 26,
1965, at 5.
23. Wang Tieya [王铁崖], Fundamental Problem of the United Nations is
to Break U.S. Control [联合国的根本问题是要打破美国的控制], PEOPLE’S DAILY [
人民日报], Nov. 19, 1965, at 1 [hereinafter Fundamental Problem].
24. Wang Tieya [王铁崖], China Asks for Nothing from the United Nations
[中国无求于联合国], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Dec. 2, 1966, at 4 [hereinafter
China Asks for Nothing].
25. Wang Tieya [王铁崖], An Ugly Drama in the United Nations [联合国
的一幕丑剧], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], July 8, 1967, at 6 [hereinafter An Ugly
Drama].
26. Chi Hsiang-Yang, Smash the New Tsars’ Theory of “Limited
Sovereignty,” 3 CHINESE L. GOV’T 84 (1969).
27. See Fu Zhu [傅朱], Rusk’s “International Law” Cannot Conceal the
Crime of Aggression against Vietnam by American Imperialism [腊斯克的”国际
法”掩盖不了美帝的侵越罪行], 2 CHINESE J. L. [法学研究] 8 (1965).
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presumably reflected the PRC’s position on the relevant issues,
but none reflected a sufficiently high level of knowledge,
independence or originality to be included in this study.
The research then shifted to a review of the material
contained in the journal Chinese Law and Government: A
Journal of Translation, which was published by the U.S.
publisher International Arts and Sciences Press, starting in
1968, but which contained translations of articles originally
written in the PRC in the 1950s and early 1960s, many of which
were overwhelmingly authentic in nature.28 This search did not
uncover any scholarly work from the time period in question.
The research then proceeded to the National Library of China in
Beijing, where a review of hardcopy materials available to the
public turned out to be the most reliable method of finding
relevant materials from this time period.
Again, it was hoped that Wang’s three-volume Selected
Materials on Modern European International Relations 18701919 would contain sufficient commentary on international law
mixed in with his review of European international relations,
especially with regard to European treaty law at the time.
However, after a thorough review of that three-volume set, this
did not prove to be the case. This presumably was the result of
Wang Tieya having to set aside his interests in international law
when he joined the Peking University’s History Department in
1952 following the Mind Reform Movement and the subsequent
abolition of the Law and Political Science Departments for being
too bourgeois.29 The same is true for Wang Tieya’s updated
Chinese translation of the eighth edition of Oppenheim’s
International Law that he worked on during the Mao era (but
did not come out until 1995), in which he noted in a preface—
Wang’s sole editorial comment in the book—that “Oppenheim’s
work is very welcome in China” because it “contains diverse
Western viewpoints on international law.”30
28. See, e.g., Chou Keng-Sheng, New Trends in Contemporary AngloAmerican Theory of International Law, 3 CHINESE L. GOV’T 20 (1970)
(published originally in Chinese in 1963; Chou Keng-Sheng is another way to
write Zhou Gengsheng).
29. See generally MacDonald, supra note 12, at 13–14.
30. See OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW [奥本海国际法] vi (Wang Tieya
trans., 8th ed. 1995); see also
de Sampayo & Nijgh, supra note 18, at 238 (nothing that Wang worked on the

9

ARTICLE 10_FRY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1000

PACE LAW REVIEW

8/23/2019 6:47 PM

Vol. 39.2

Another candidate for inclusion in this study was Wang
Tieya’s 1974 collection entitled Materials on the Law of the Sea,
which contained the key PRC and UN documents relating to the
law of the sea leading up to this period.31 The skillful selection
of materials helps give the reader a glimpse into the PRC
government’s position concerning the law of the sea during this
period, with a clear emphasis on state sovereignty, as well as its
animosity towards colonialism and hegemony.32 However, this
Article does not include this collection among the scholarly work
from this period because only the minimal glossary of terms at
the back of the collection showed genuinely original work by
Wang,33 and it arguably is not sufficient to satisfy this Article’s
definition of scholarship.
By far the most significant source from this time period is a
two-volume textbook from 1976 by Zhou Gengsheng entitled
International Law.34 Zhou affectionately was called the “Dean”
of Chinese international legal scholars and legal scholars in
general, and this two-volume textbook appears to represent his
life’s work.35 According to Chen Tiqiang, Ronald St. John
MacDonald (relying extensively on multiple interviews with
Wang Tieya) and others, Zhou’s International Law was finished
in 1969, but not published until 1976 due to the political tensions
at that time.36 Regardless, both of the 1969 and 1976 dates fit
translation along with T.C. Chen).
31. See generally Wang’s Materials on the Law of the Sea, supra note 14.
32. See generally id.
33. See id. at 520–21.
34. ZHOU GENGSHENG [周鲠生], INTERNATIONAL LAW [国际法] (1976)
[hereinafter ZHOU].
35. See MacDonald, supra note 12, at 5–6 (quoting from an interview with
Wang Tieya); see also ZHOU, supra note 34, at 7–8 (noting that Zhou was
Wang’s mentor and friend); Wang Tieya, Teaching and Research of
International Law in Present Day China, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 77, 78
(1983) (describing Wang’s relationship with Zhou); Chen Tiqiang,
International Law by Zhou Gengsheng, in SELECTED ARTICLES FROM THE
CHINESE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 240 (Chinese Soc. Int’l L. ed. 1983)
(book review) (“Those in China who studied international law after 1925 were
all his students, either in college or under his private tutorship”).
36. See MacDonald, supra note 12, at 5 (internal citations omitted);
Tiqiang, supra note 35, at 240; LI MOUSHENG, THE BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF
PROFESSOR ZHOU GENG SHENG [ZHOU GENG SHENG JIAO SHOU ZHUAN LVE]; see
also Leo Gross & Vratislav Pechota, Selected Articles from Chinese Yearbook of
International Law, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 851, 853–54 (1985) (book review).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/10

10

ARTICLE 10_FRY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

8/23/2019 6:47 PM

MAO-ERA INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP

1001

within the 1965 to 1979 period in question.37 Hungdah Chiu
asserts that Zhou’s book was completed in 1964,38 presumably
because the publisher of the 1976 version Commercial Press
inserted a preface stating Zhou did not work on the manuscript
after 1964 due to illness, which the publisher of the 2007 version
Wuhan University Press repeated in an abbreviated form. 39
This 1964 completion date enables Hungdah Chiu to maintain
his claim that there was no international law scholarship in the
PRC between 1965 and 1979, notwithstanding the 1976
publication date.
However, four factors undermine the
reliability of the 1964 completion date in the preface. First, it is
not difficult to imagine how Commercial Press had political
reasons for giving (and Wuhan University Press repeating) an
incorrect completion date, as this sort of work was not supposed
to have been produced during the Cultural Revolution.
Additionally, these publishers were seen as tools of the
Communist Party of China. At the same time, Chen Tiqiang and
Wang Tieya had no conceivable reason for giving an incorrect
date. Interestingly, the preface to the 1976 version of Zhou’s
International Law provides a disclaimer that Zhou’s focus was
on Western bourgeois international law, his ideas reflected an
influence from Western and Soviet sources that was wrong (even
though he extensively criticized these works), and the reader
should be cautious and use a Marxist-Leninist and Maoist way
of interpreting the book.40 This detailed disclaimer does not
appear in the 1981 or 2007 versions, although the 2007 version
repeats the assertion that the book was completed in 1964 due
to Zhou’s illness. Second, the preface in the 1976 version states
that the book was only internally released for use by diplomats
37. See MacDonald, supra note 12, at 5.
38. See Leo Gross & Hangdah Chiu, Guoji Fa (International Law), 77 AM.
J. INT’L L. 977, 977 (1983) (book review) [hereinafter Chiu Book Review]; see
also Wolfgang Kess, International Law, 16 VERFASSUNG UND RECHT ÜBERSEE
204 (1983); Kim, supra note 3, at 127; Zhang Wenbing, International Law:
Western Traditions and Chinese Characteristics—Re-reading Zhou
Gengsheng’s International Law [国际法：西方传统与中国特色—重读周鲠生《国
际法》随想], 7 J. COMP. L. [比较法学研究] 187 (1993).
39. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at i; ZHOU GENGSHENG [周鲠生], 1
INTERNATIONAL LAW [国际法], at preface p. x, (Wuhan University Press [武汉大
学出版社] 2007). Interestingly, Commercial Press did not include this preface
in its 1981 version of that book.
40. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at i.
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and academics.41 However, a search of the Online Computer
Library Center’s WorldCat union catalog shows that twenty-six
of the 72,000 libraries on that database have the 1976 version
(including libraries in Hong Kong and Taiwan), whereas only
four libraries have the 1981 version (including libraries in the
United Kingdom and the United States). This suggests a
broader circulation than just internally, given that it is
somewhat difficult to see Hong Kong or Taiwan as being
“internal” in the 1960s, notwithstanding the PRC’s claims to
these territories. This apparent misstatement brings up the
possibility that the assertion of a 1964 completion date also was
incorrect. Third, Zhou apparently wrote International Law in
his later years while he was sick,42 which would mean that his
becoming sick did not determine when he stopped working on
the book, as Commercial Press and Wuhan University Press
claimed.
Fourth, Chen Tiqiang and Wang Tieya were
contemporaries and colleagues of Zhou,43 and so they
presumably would have had more reliable, firsthand knowledge
of when Zhou completed the 1976 book than the publishers.
Critics will point to content within Zhou’s book that
suggests that it was completed before the Cultural Revolution.
For example, as explained in Part III(6)(e) below, Zhou wrote
that no international convention regulating outer space existed
at that time.44 However, it is common knowledge that the first
outer space treaty—the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Mood and Other Celestial Bodies—was concluded
in 1967, thereby suggesting that Zhou had completed the book
before 1967. This point assumes that Zhou was perfectly up-todate on all areas of international law at the time of writing the
book (which might not have been the case), it assumes that all
parts of the book were completed at the same time, and it

41. See id.
42. See He Qinhua, Travelling Around Europe and Asia: The Father of
International Law in China [游学欧亚的周鲠生：中国近代国际法之父], Jan. 5,
2010; HAN YANGUANG, ENCYCLOPEDIA SINITICA: VOLUME OF LAW [中国大百科全
书：法学篇] 810 (1984); Tiqiang, supra note 35, at 241.
43. See MacDonald, supra note 12, at 5; Tieya, supra note 35, at 78
(describing Wang’s relationship with Zhou).
44. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 413.
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assumes that the period between 1965 and 1967 is not relevant
to this study, which it is.
Regardless, none of these factors change the undisputed fact
that the book came out in 1976, which is the usual way to ascribe
a date to a publication, not the date of manuscript completion, 45
and which is well within the 1965 to 1979 timeframe in question.
Of course, with the knowledge that books and articles with a
publication date during the post-Mao era could have been
produced during the part of the Mao era in question, there could
be many more pertinent publications to include in this Article.
However, there is no easy way to tell when manuscripts were
produced, which constitutes a real barrier in providing a
complete census of late-Mao-era international law scholarship.
Notwithstanding this disclaimer, your authors feel relatively
confident that this Article has dealt with all of the main lateMao-era international law scholarship that currently is publicly
available.
At least three English-language book reviews have been
written on Zhou’s book by U.S.-based or U.S.-trained
international law scholars,46 and at least four additional sources
have cited the 1976 version of Zhou’s book.47 Therefore, it is
clear that Zhou’s book is well known, or should be well known,
among international law scholars, making it that much more
surprising that commentators continue to maintain that no
international law scholarship was produced between 1965 and
1979. At the same time, as most of these reviews were on the
brief side—including a one-paragraph review and a one-page
review—this Article adds value by providing the most detailed
review to date.
As the following parts show, the knowledge, independence
and originality contained in Zhou Gengsheng’s International
Law arguably are sufficient to categorize it as scholarly, thereby
45. See BOOK INDUSTRY STUDY GROUP, BEST PRACTICES FOR PRODUCT
METADATA 169–70 (2015).
46. See Tiqiang, supra note 35, at 240; Chiu Book Review, supra note 38,
at 977; Kess, supra note 38, at 204.
47. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 3, at 121, 127; Pasha L. Hsieh, The
Discipline of International Law in Republican China and Contemporary
Taiwan, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 87, 119–20 (2015); Wei Wang,
Historical Evolution of National Treatment in China, 39 INT’L LAW. 759, 760–
61 (2005); Gross & Pechota, supra note 36, at 853–54.
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refuting the notion that no international law scholarship was
produced in the People’s Republic of China between 1965 and
1979. The fact that no PRC international law scholars make a
similar assertion as Chiu, and some even mock this assertion,48
should have signaled to U.S.-based international law scholars
(especially those with Chinese proficiency or those with
sufficient resources to hire assistants with Chinese proficiency)
that greater scrutiny was warranted. The following part
analyzes and evaluates Zhou’s International Law in detail.
III. Zhou Gengsheng’s International Law
Zhou Gengsheng’s 1976 book International Law, which
essentially took the format of a treatise, covered many of the
main topics the market has come to expect of international law
textbooks. These topics include the concept and origin of
international law, the relationship between domestic and
international law, international legal personality and statehood,
state responsibility, state jurisdiction, residents, territory,
diplomatic relations, treaty law, international organizations,
international dispute settlement, and the International Court of
Justice.49 The fact that 1981 and 2007 versions of this treatise
were created, the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs uses the
2007 version,50 and it still is in circulation attests to the overall
quality of International Law. Obvious gaps in coverage include
international human rights law, international criminal law,
international humanitarian law and a few others, although that
might be expected of such a treatise from this period, when many
Western and socialist scholars alike saw little use of war-time
laws following the atrocities of the Second World War.51 Chen
Tiqiang asserts that Zhou did not intentionally leave out war48. See YU MINYOU & LIU HENG, THE DIRECTION OF DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CHINA [论国际法在中国的发展走向] 5 (2010); WUHAN
UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL SCIENCE [武汉大学学报:哲学社会
科学版] 705–22 (2010).
49.
See ZHOU, supra note 34; About Us, COMMERCIAL PRESS,
www.commercialpress.com.hk/ww/aboutus.html (last visited June 10, 2019).
50. See United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, References and
Resources, www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/st_space_064resrefE.pdf (last
visited June 10, 2019).
51. See Tiqiang, supra note 35, at 241.
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time laws from this book, but rather he died before these parts
could be completed,52 which seems questionable. Nevertheless,
each chapter started with a recitation of the general principles,
which showed mastery of each topic, thus satisfying the
knowledge requirement of scholarship, and then provided a
strong evaluation of those principles from the PRC or socialist
perspective, including relevant examples, which showed clear
mastery of the PRC’s policies at that time.
Hungdah Chiu and Samuel Kim would appear to downplay
the significance of this book by asserting that Zhou relied too
heavily on the eighth edition of Oppenheim’s International Law,
both in structure and in substance.53 With the structure, there
admittedly are considerable similarities in the chapter titles
alone, even though the eighth edition of Volume 1 relating to
peace has sixteen chapters, and Zhou’s book has twelve. 54
However, such similarities are too superficial a basis for
downplaying the significance of Zhou’s book. After all, most
textbooks from this period shared similarities in their tables of
contents,55 presumably for the obvious reason that international
52. See id. at 241–42.
53. See Chiu Book Review, supra note 38, at 978 (“The organization of the
book is primarily based on Oppenheim’s treatise on international law . . .
. Reliance on Oppenheim poses some problems, because by the time the author
completed the manuscript, Lauterpacht’s Oppenheim was 9 years old and did
not totally reflect some important subsequent developments in international
law.”); Kim, supra note 3, at 142; see also Tiqiang, supra note 35, at 242.
54. Zhou’s book does not address any of the topics found in Volume 2 of
Oppenheim’s International Law, which relates to war. See Tiqiang, supra note
35, at 241–42.
55. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW vii–xix (3d ed. 1979); D.J. LATHAM BROWN, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW vii–
ix (1970); D.P. O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW v–xxiii (1970); J.G. STARKE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW xi–xiv (8th ed. 1977) (although including
the law relating to war and neutrality); see also WOLFGANG G. FRIEDMANN ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW xv-xvi (Jesse H. Choper et
al. 1969) (adding use of force); L.C. GREEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
CASES vii–xiii (4th ed. 1978) (adding international criminal law, international
torts and the law of armed conflict, among others); D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW vii-ix (1979) (adding use of force); MANUAL
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW v-vi (Max Sørensen ed., 1968) (same); WERNER
LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION vii (1979)
(same); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW viii–xv (6th ed.1976) (adding the law of armed conflict and a nuclear-age
context); RICHARD N. SWIFT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT AND CLASSIC ix–xi
(1969) (adding use of force). For a good example of how non-Western textbooks
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law involves a relatively standard set of topics relating to the
rules involving the interaction of subjects of international law.
As Chen Tiqiang pointed out about Zhou’s book, it “was written
more or less following the conventional system in the
arrangement of its chapters . . .,”56 and this appears to be an
overwhelmingly accurate assessment.
When it comes to the substance, while Oppenheim’s
International Law influenced Zhou, these are two entirely
different books. For example, Oppenheim’s book and Zhou’s
book adopt completely different fundamental ideologies, as well
as different views on many aspects of international law. These
differences are highlighted throughout this Article, although
such comparisons are illustrative, not exhaustive. As the
Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (“CPIFA”) notes in
the preface of its 1954 translation of the seventh edition of
Oppenheim’s International Law, the book reflects the
imperialist and capitalist approach to international law, 57
whereas Zhou’s book largely, but not always, was in line with
the PRC’s policies at that time, as explained throughout this
part. Even if Zhou’s book was perfectly in line with PRC policies
at that time or only cited publicly accessible government sources,
it is not a valid basis for downplaying the significance of the
book, as Hungdah Chiu did,58 because many Western
international law textbooks and treatises at the time were in
line with their home government’s policies and cited publicly
accessible government sources, including Oppenheim’s
International Law.59 Moreover, the perspective in Oppenheim’s
International Law and Zhou’s book differ dramatically on a host
at this time were broader than the normal Western textbook on international
law, see R.C. HINGORANI, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW xi–xii (1979) (adding
chapters on airspace, terrorism, espionage and war-related chapters, among
many others); see also Tiqiang, supra note 35, at 241 (“The book was written
more or less following the conventional system in the arrangements of its
chapters . . . .”).
56. Tiqiang, supra note 35, at 241.
57. See OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW [奥本海国际法] i–ii (Chinese
People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs trans., 7th ed. 1954) [hereinafter
Oppenheim’s International Law in Chinese].
58. See Chiu Book Review, supra note 38, at 978
59. See, e.g., LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 200,
204, 281, 336, 651–52, 663, 675, 690–91, 698, 700 (Hersch Lauterpacht,
ed., 8th ed. 1955).
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of specific points, as shown throughout this Article. For
example, CPIFA interpreted the seventh edition of Oppenheim’s
International Law as viewing Tibet as a quasi-sovereign state
and that it was just for states to intervene in other states’ affairs
to protect their overseas nationals, just as the United States
intervened in Cuba n 1906 and the United Kingdom intervened
in China in 1927, which CPIFA and the PRC rejected.60 These
types of ideological and specific differences make it hard to see
any meaningful similarities between these books beyond the
relatively superficial ordering of a few of the chapters and Zhou’s
engagement with Oppenheim’s assertions. Finally, it must be
noted that it was not uncommon for Western international law
textbooks at that time to be influenced heavily by Oppenheim’s
International Law,61 presumably because it was the best, most
comprehensive textbook on the market at that time. Such
influence has not stopped those works from being considered as
scholarly, so why should it with Zhou’s book?
Zhou’s consistency with PRC policies and criticism of U.S.
and other imperialist policies concerning international law
would be expected of a product from this time period. In
particular, Zhou emphasized the PRC’s position as the rightful
heir to China (as opposed to the Republic of China, or Taiwan),
the peaceful nature of socialist states that opposes imperialism
and supports liberation of previously colonized states
everywhere (especially in Asia and Africa), and the importance
of the peaceful resolution of disputes through negotiation (not
through force), as explained below. As shown throughout this
Article, these points are in line with PRC policies at that time. 62
60. See Oppenheim’s International Law in Chinese, supra note 57, at 208,
239, 244.
61. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 55 (citing OPPENHEIM, supra note 59);
SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra note 55, at 163, 336, 411, 463, 475, 539
(6th ed. 1976); Benedict Kingsbury, Legal Positivism as Normative Politics:
International Society, Balance of Power and Lassa Oppenheim’s Positive
International Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 401 (2002) (discussing the overwhelming
influence of Oppenheim on international lawyers since the beginning of the
20th century); Martin V. Totaro, Legal Positivism, Constructivism, and
International Human Rights Law: The Case of Participatory Development, 48
VA. J. INT’L L. 719, 726–27 (2008) (same).
62. See Deng Xiaoping, The Speech of Deng Xiaoping (Vice Prime
Minister) in the 6th special meeting of General Assembly of the United Nation
at
1974
[邓小平1974年联合国代表大会发言],
PEOPLE
[人],
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Given this similarity with the PRC’s position, it may at first
seem surprising that Commercial Press felt obliged to add the
preface to the 1976 version that warned readers of the Western
influence that Zhou’s book exhibited. However, upon closer
inspection, it becomes easy to see what the PRC government and
Commercial Press would have been worried about concerning
Zhou’s treatise—for example, Zhou’s characterization as custom
the practice of pre-maturely recognizing states in Chapter
Three. Therefore, while critics might challenge the
characterization of Zhou’s treatise as scholarly based on an
apparent lack of independence due to toeing the party line in
many instances, so to speak, these sorts of divergences from PRC
policy strengthen the perceived independence of this work.
Chinese international law scholars have recognized the
scholarly contribution of Zhou’s book. For example, Chen
Tiqiang succinctly summarized this work in the following
manner:
International Law, the most voluminous and
erudite work of [Zhou’s], was completed by Prof.
Zhou at the age of 80 when his health was failing,
and especially when his eye-sight was weakening.
With an astonishing will power, Prof. Zhou wrote
this 600,000-character book which is rich in
information and extensive documentation. It has
a powerful logic, well-knit structure and great
succinctness. His immense knowledge and great
seriousness in academic pursuit are worth
emulation by all of us.63

www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/6688/6715/20011023/588430.html (last
visited June 10, 2019); see also
The Declaration of People’s Republic of China in the World Conference to
Defend Peace [中国保卫世界和平大会宣言], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Oct. 4,
1949; Jing Lu, The Style of Peace Diplomacy of People’s Republic of China [中
国和平外交的风格与气派], CPC NEWS [中国共产党新闻网], Aug. 2, 2017,
http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0802/c40531-29443820.html (last visited
at June 10, 2019); The Geneva Conference is Inaugurated! [日内瓦会议开幕了],
PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Apr. 29, 1954.
63. Tiqiang, supra note 35, at 241.
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Here, Chen Tiqiang seems to be making the case for why Zhou’s
work was scholarly, essentially a similar definition as the one
this Article adopts, as outlined in the introductory part above,
and this Article would agree with Chen’s assessment.
Combining the knowledge, independence and originality that is
apparent throughout, especially his apt selection of examples to
support his assertions, this book constitutes the clearest
example of scholarly work during the period between 1965 and
1979.
1.

Introductory Chapter

Starting with his introduction to international law, Zhou
provided an interesting comparison of Western and socialist
approaches to international law, quoting from such sources as
Oppenheim as well as the accepted Soviet definition, criticizing
the former for its formalism and praising the latter for
promoting peace through collective security.64 This point was in
line with PRC policies at that time.65 Zhou then identified four
features of international law: (1) internationality, which
emphasized formation through consent between states and
excluded individuals as subjects; (2) legality, which excluded
non-legal norms like comity from its scope and recognized
difficulties in enforceability; (3) generality, which required the
binding of all states to a particular norm; and (4) classism, which
required law to serve politics.66 This last point was particularly
in line with PRC policies at that time.67 Zhou took issue with
the notion that international law was a European creation
because states during the times of ancient China adopted rules
and customs, although he showed a large measure of objectivity
and independence by admitting that international law generally
was a product of Europe in that international law did not gain
64. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 1–3.
65. See MINYOU & HENG, supra note 48; WUHAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF
PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL SCIENCE, supra note 48, at 705–22.
66. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 3–8.
67. See Jianming Du, Re-understand the Class Nature of Law [重新认识
法的阶级性], 2010 J. JILIN NORMAL UNIV. [吉林师范大学学报:人文社会科学版]
72–74 (2010); Yaohai Wang, The Ten Principles of Marxist Jurisprudence [马
克思主义法学的十大原理], 1 SOC. SCI. HEILONGJIANG [黑龙江社会科学], 103–10
(2016).
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influence over international relations until after the 1684 Peace
of Westphalia.68 International law became less of a European
phenomenon as more colonies in North and South America
gained independence in the 19th century and Western values
spread to Eastern states.69 This Western influence ultimately
led to Asian states—namely, China, Japan, Thailand and
Korea—being forced to conclude unequal treaties with Western
states and Africa being carved up by colonial powers in search of
terra nullius, thereby subjecting these regions to imperialist
forms of international law.70
Zhou heralded the 1917
Communist Revolution as introducing a new form of
international law that promoted peace by prohibiting territorial
seizure by force, inter alia.71 According to Zhou, collaboration
between socialist and capitalist states enabled the conclusion of
the UN Charter, which instrument embodied socialist norms
such as respecting people’s equal rights, the principle of selfdetermination, and the non-intervention principle that
emphasizes state sovereignty.72 These two points are in line
with PRC policies at that time.73 The first point about the
prohibition of territorial seizure by force is interesting, as one
would have expected Zhou to point to the end of class struggle or
the elevation of the proletariat or peasant leading to peace. 74
Zhou seems to have seen such an assertion as impossible
because class struggle within international law continued
during the UN era, with the socialist approach promoting the
people’s interests and the capitalist approach promoting
capitalists’ interests.75 Other Chinese commentators during this
time shared this same view of the biases of international law. 76
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 39–42.
See id. at 43–51.
See id. at 50–51.
See id. at 51–53.
See id. at 53–54.
See Resist Aggression, Peaceful Coexistence [反抗侵略，和平共处],
PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Apr. 4, 1955; Xiaoping, supra note 62.
74. See 2 Sources of Chinese Tradition 346–47, 407–09 (William Theodore
de Bary & Irene Bloom eds., 2d ed. 2001).
75. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 55.
76. See Xixiang Song, About the Class Nature of International Law [关于
国际法的阶级性], 1986 Shanghai Univ. J. [上海大学学报：社会科学版] 103–05
(1986); Naibin Xu, Discussing the Definition of International Law [谈谈国际法
的定义], 1984 NW. UNIV. POLI. L.J. [西北政法学院学报] 79 (1984).
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All of these commentators essentially downplayed the strides
that labor and economic development had made on the
international level since the end of the First World War and
their impact on (or rather perceived impact on) peace.77
Concerning the point about collaboration between capitalist and
socialist states leading to the conclusion of the UN Charter, this
is noticeably different from the standard Western explanation of
how the UN Charter was concluded, which portrays the Soviet
representatives as disagreeable and the Chinese representatives
as not being particularly socialist.78
Again, critics might point to such descriptions of
international law by Zhou as reflecting a lack of independence,
given their strong socialist tint. However, such descriptions
demonstrate a somewhat sophisticated understanding of the
autopoetic nature of international law that allows for different
interpretations of international law, which was present in the
Western literature at this time.79 This stands in stark contrast
to Chiu’s approach to international law, for example, which
seemed to see valid approaches to international law as requiring
confirmation from “the writings of Western international law
scholars,”80 which is reflected neither in the mainstream
literature on international law nor in actual practice.
2.

Main Participants of International Law

In Chapter Two on the main participants of International
Law, Zhou stressed the focus on states and downplayed the role
of international organizations and individuals to being targets
of enforcement of international law because their rights derive
from treaties between states.81 Zhou saw any effort to elevate
international organizations to the status of subjects of
77.
See generally DANIEL G. PARTAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (1965); WIL
D. VERWEY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972).
78. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING
OF THE UNITED NATIONS ch. 7 (2003).
79. See D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 52–53 (2d ed. 1976).
80. Hungdah Chiu, Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist
Chinese Views of Unequal Treaties, in CHINA’S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES 239, 267 (Jerome A. Cohen ed., 1972).
81. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 61–64.
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international law as an effort by capitalist states who control
those international organizations to increase their power. 82
Moreover, Zhou opposed partial enjoyment of sovereignty by
other non-state entities on account of the belief that they
struggle under colonialism.83 This point was in line with PRC
policy at that time.84 Zhou emphasized that Tibet is an
autonomous region in the PRC, not a sovereign state, a halfsovereign state or colony.85 Zhou also spent some time
discussing the status of the Vatican in concluding that it is not
a state and not a participant in international law,86 which
presumably was to justify the PRC’s lack of diplomatic relations
with the Vatican.
a.

Concept of a State

Concerning the concept of a state under international law,
Zhou asserted that any attempt to suggest there are “two
Chinas” undermines Chinese sovereignty, which is against
international law.87 This point was in line with PRC policies at
that time.88 He asserted that a local government of a country
cannot constitute a state, and so any local government, unless
otherwise authorized by the state, cannot engage in foreign
relations.89 For example, when Tibet sent its so-called diplomats
overseas in 1950, the Chinese government immediately denied
that it had sent any diplomats.90 Zhou identified a significant
exception—that a nation that is fighting for independence,
building its own country, and developing its own political
organizations, even if overseas, can be treated as a sovereign

82. See id. at 67–70.
83. See id. at 75–77.
84. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Intensely Remonstrates that India
Intervened the Domestic Issues of People’s Republic of China [我外交部强烈抗议
印度干涉中国内政], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Jan. 3, 1966 [hereinafter
Ministry of Foreign Affairs]; China Asks for Nothing, supra note 24.
85. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 76–77.
86. See id. at 101–03.
87. See id. at 60.
88. See China Asks for Nothing, supra note 24.
89. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 60.
90. See id. at 60–61.
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state.91 This appears to have been roughly in line with Western
approaches to international law at that time, which saw a
blurred line between states and entities struggling for such
status.92 While Oppenheim’s International Law generally
agrees with the general Western approach, it nevertheless
emphasizes the objective nature of state recognition and
requires a distinction to be made between insurgents that
constitute a belligerent power and insurgents that constitute a
state.93 This would seem to go against how Zhou portrayed
international law on this point because he did not mention
liberation from colonialism. It has been particularly difficult to
find evidence showing whether Zhou’s assertion was in line with
PRC policies at that time. On the one hand, if this assertion was
referring to the case of Taiwan, the PRC obviously could not
support the position that Taiwan could be treated as a sovereign
state even though Chiang Kai-shek had developed Taiwan’s own
political organizations. On the other hand, PRC leaders at that
time generally had expressed support for ex-colonial states in
their fight for independence. No readily available evidence for
this latter point could be found. Therefore, it must be concluded
that Zhou’s assertion here falls within a gray area of PRC policy.
The main point that Zhou made with participation in
international law is that an individual cannot be directly
involved in international law.94 States, instead of individuals,
are the main participants of international law.95 Therefore,
international law regulates acts of states, not acts of
individuals.96 Zhou pointed out that all the rights an individual
is entitled to under international law are not international
91. See id. at 61.
92. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 80–82; STARKE, supra note 55,
at 149–57 (focusing on the political elements of state recognition); see also
JAMES R. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 257–63
(1979) (placing the emphasis on whether the struggling entity can be seen as
a self-determination unit).
93. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 127–29; see also HARRIS, supra note
55, at 671–72 (recognizing an exception on the prohibition of intervention
where insurgents are fighting for national liberation in the decolonization
context); STARKE, supra note 55, at 174–77 (but focusing on this in the context
of recognizing a belligerent as a government, not as a state).
94. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 62.
95. See id.
96. See id.
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rights per se.97 Instead, they are the rights conferred by national
laws as a result of an implementation of international law. 98
Zhou identified several examples that Western jurists provide to
show that individuals have a role in international law: (1)
sanctioning individuals for war crimes and piracy; (2) protection
of individual rights, such as protecting minorities; and (3)
individuals can bring claims against a state in an arbitral
tribunal under Section 297 of the Versailles Treaty.99 Zhou
asserted that these, in fact, still are a state’s international rights
and duties because they are created by inter-state treaties.100
Individuals simply are the targets of implementation. With
regard to sanctioning, war criminals and pirates simply are the
targets of punishment; they are sanctioned according to interstate treaties.101 As for individuals bringing claims against
states, compensation is made to the state that the individual
belongs to, rather than to the individual directly, and so the
dispute actually is between the states, not the individual and a
state.102
Zhou emphasized that international organizations are not
included among the main participants of international law. 103
For example, while the United Nations has the function of
peacekeeping and other important international duties, this
does not mean that it is a main participant in international
law.104 This is because the United Nations is made up of member
states, and the organization itself lacks sovereignty.105 Zhou
dismissed arguments that international organizations are main
participants as attempts to amplify the powers of the United
Nations in order to undermine state sovereignty, which is
convenient for imperialists’ expansion plans.106

97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 67.
100. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 67.
101. See id. at 68.
102. See id. at 69.
103. See id.
104. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 69.
105. See id. at 70.
106. See id.
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Concept of Sovereignty

When it comes to sovereignty, Zhou explained that it cannot
be divided into internal and external sovereignty, as some
Western scholars are inclined to do in promoting imperialism
and colonialism.107 In particular, a vassal state essentially is
created when its internal sovereignty is acknowledged, but its
external sovereignty is denied.108
Zhou asserted that all states have both types of sovereignty,
which are two concepts that cannot be divided.109 Even for halfsovereign states, their sovereignty still exists, and unless they
fundamentally cease to exist, they have the right to get rid of the
external control and regain full sovereignty at any time.110 In a
unitary state, there is only one centralized authority that
represents the entire country.111 Even in a remote area in a
unitary state, there can be an autonomous region under the
state’s law, but such a region cannot be seen as a state under
international law.112 These two points were in line with PRC
policies at that time.113 The first point seems more like a
tautology than an assertion of international law. The second
point appears to be in line with Western approaches to
international law at that time, inasmuch as federal states and
confederations were seen as a certain type of state under
international law.114
Zhou took issue with Oppenheim’s
International Law listing of Tibet as one of the “half-sovereign
states,”115 which Zhou claimed was evidence of a British
imperialist deliberately trying to complicate the facts.116
However, Oppenheim’s International Law appears to be an
exception among the international law textbooks from this
period concerning this point.
107. See id. at 74–75.
108. See id. at 75.
109. See id. at 75–76.
110. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 75–76.
111. See id. at 76.
112. See id.
113. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 84; China Asks for
Nothing, supra note 24.
114. See, e.g., STARKE, supra note 55, at 129–30.
115. OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 257–58.
116. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 76–77.
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Zhou spent a considerable amount of space arguing that the
Vatican is not a state, and so it is not a participant in
international law.117 Even though the Pope possessed territory,
he lost this territory by 1870 when the Vatican was integrated
with Italy.118 Therefore, the Pope is no longer a head of state.119
Although Italy has passed the Law of Papal Guarantees to
preserve the Pope’s status, this is in fact national law. 120
However, the situation changed after the Lateran Treaty in
1929, which to a certain extent reinstated the Vatican’s status
as a state.121 However, it should be noted that the Lateran
Treaty stipulated that the Vatican is only responsible for
religious affairs and would not take part in international
affairs.122 Furthermore, the Vatican does not have sufficient
territory and people to gain statehood, and so it is not a
participant of international law.123
3.

State Recognition

With regard to state recognition in Chapter Three, Zhou
accentuated the need for colonies to gain independence before
they can be recognized as states, contrary to how the United
States and Japan had prematurely recognized states following
expansion by force.124 Zhou noted how the PRC was the rightful
heir to China, both within the United Nations and elsewhere
internationally, and so the PRC should not have to apply for UN
membership or otherwise sue for ownership of Chinese
properties and assets.125 This Chapter, along with Chapter
Four, essentially depicted how the PRC viewed its international
status and how the PRC conducted its diplomatic affairs. First,
Zhou pointed out that the PRC only recognized those states that
gained independence from colonial liberation and would never
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See id. at 101–03.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See ZHOU, supra note 34.
See id.
See id. at 109–12.
See id. at 158–60.
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recognize a state prematurely, thereby criticizing the United
States and Japan for prematurely or inappropriately refusing to
recognize the Soviet Union and the PRC for political reason and
recognizing Manchuria, respectively. This point appears to have
been in line with PRC policies at that time.126
With regard to the unfair treaties previously entered into
between China, the Qing government, the Republic of China and
other foreign entities, Zhou explained how the PRC adopted a
piecemeal approach towards each treaty. However, Zhou
asserted that the validity of all those treaties would be subject
to the PRC’s acknowledgement of those treaties as being valid.
As for succession, the PRC deemed itself the rightful heir to
China, both within the United Nations and internationally.
Especially with regard to the PRC’s position within the United
Nations, Zhou argued that this is an issue of reinstating the
PRC’s position as the representative of China rather than
reviewing whether to allow the PRC to join as a new member
state. This argument, of course, enabled the PRC to benefit from
the unique status of the Republic of China in the United Nations
previously, especially as one of the founding members and one
of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Zhou
further condemned the United States for disrupting the PRC’s
return to the United Nations. Zhou revisited these sorts of
issues in Chapter Ten.
a.

Comparisons of State Recognition

Zhou started out his discussion of state recognition by
challenging the customary international law of “pre-maturely
recognizing a new country that may offend the integrity of the
sovereign state and is illegal interference.”127 Zhou gave an
example of when the United States recognized Panama’s
independence in 1903.128 There also are existing territories that
are occupied by foreign forces where a puppet state has been
created.129 Those puppet states must not be recognized, as it

126.
127.
128.
129.

See China Asks for Nothing, supra note 24; Xiaoping, supra note 62.
See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 110.
See id.
See id.
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illegally would undermine a state’s sovereignty.130 Zhou pointed
to Manchuria as an example. Manchuria was a puppet state
when it was under Japanese invasion, and its establishment was
entirely orchestrated by Japanese troops and officials who were
not part of a genuine independence movement.131 Manchuria
was not supported by the Chinese people and was merely a tool
of the Japanese government, so it lacked independence,
autonomous will, stability and continuity—all of which are
needed for statehood.132
Zhou compared and contrasted the actions of the PRC and
the United States towards emerging states. For example, he
observed how the PRC had been supportive towards states that
emerged from colonial liberation, such as Algeria, Yemen and
Syria.133 This point was in line with PRC policies at that time. 134
However, Zhou’s assertion would appear to be inconsistent with
what he wrote earlier in Chapter Two of the book—that a nation
fighting for independence can be treated as a sovereign state—
because presumably states can gain independence through
contexts other than colonial liberation. As mentioned above,
states typically have discretion in deciding which entities they
recognize as states, within certain limitations. Zhou focused on
the practice of the United States, which, as an imperialist state,
usually used non-recognition or recognition dependent on
certain conditions in order to achieve its diplomatic goals of
intervening in other states’ affairs.135 Zhou pointed out how the
U.S. government refused to recognize the Soviet Union and the
PRC, thereby defying the people’s right to choose their
government and the principle of non-intervention.136 Zhou’s
description of this as custom seems like a significant concession,
which likely was unintentional, as it was shockingly far from the
PRC’s official policy.137 At most, it shows his independence, or
130. See id.
131. See id. at 110–11.
132. See id.
133. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 112.
134. See generally Xiaoping, supra note 62.
135. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 128.
136. See id.
137. See Celebrate that the Right of the People’s Republic of China in the
United Nations has been Resumed [庆祝我国恢复在联合国的合法权利], PEOPLE’S
DAILY [人民日报], Oct. 31, 1971; Chinese People Must Liberate Tibet [中国人民
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at a minimum a lack of careful censorship of Zhou’s work by the
PRC government at that time. Either way, this example
supports the characterization of Zhou’s work as being scholarly
in nature.
b.

Succession of a State

Zhou asserted that the PRC, as a main participant of
international law, is a continuation of China following its
liberation, and not a new state.138 Nevertheless, the liabilities
that China undertook before the PRC came into power should be
treated in a different way because the PRC is no longer that halfcolonized state with its own history and social institutions.139
Zhou was adamant that those liabilities that stemmed from
unequal treaties from the past were unacceptable, and they
must be dealt with separately.140 This point was in line with
PRC policies at that time,141 and it was progressive in light of
Western policies at that time. Indeed, only a few commentators
discussed forgiveness of odious debts by former governments
during that time period.142 Oppenheim’s International Law
certainly was not one of them. Only in the past two decades have
states actually started to forgive odious debts,143 although it
一定要解放西藏], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Sept. 7, 1949; Never Allow the
Foreign Invaders Annex the Territory of the People’s Republic of China—Tibet
[决不容许外国侵略者吞并中国的领土—西藏], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报] , Sept.
3, 1949; Superstitious Beliefs, supra note 20; The Forum of Students from Tibet
and Neimenggu [蒙藏学校师生分别座谈 斥英美印侵藏阴谋 藏族应与国内各民族
团结一致，在中共领导下，斗争到底！], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Sept. 6,
1949.
138. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 155.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 156.
141. See The People’s Republic of China Welcomes the Authentic FriendlyEqual Diplomatic Relations [新中国欢迎真正友好平等的邦交], PEOPLE’S DAILY [
人民日报], Oct. 8, 1949 [hereinafter Authentic Friendly-Equal Diplomatic
Relations].
142. See, e.g., D.P. O’CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 187–89
(1956); D.P. O’Connell, Independence and Problems of State Succession, in THE
NEW NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 7, 26–30 (William V.
O’Brien ed. 1965); Sarah Ludington & Mitu Gulati, A Convenient Untruth:
Fact and Fantasy in the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 595 (2008)
(discussing Alexander Sack’s work from the 1920s on odious debts).
143. See Sabine Michalowski & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Ius Cogens,
Transitional Justice and Other Trends of the Debate on Odious Debts: A
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presumably was not unusual to have a debtor state come up with
that argument during any period of time. Zhou described the
approach that the PRC took towards old treaties in the following
manner: the PRC does not think that the old treaties continue
to be valid or invalid, but rather that treaty obligations of the
PRC and the Republic of China must be viewed separately.144
Before the PRC acknowledges an old treaty, no foreign state can
make a claim against the PRC based on that old treaty.145 In
essence, Zhou seemed to be saying that the PRC is a new state
with regard to China’s prior financial obligations, but it is not a
new state for the purposes relating to the United Nations, for
example.
With regard to China’s representation at the United
Nations, China is a founding member state and permanent
member of the UN Security Council, so the PRC, as its successor,
is the rightful heir to all these roles.146 The victory of the
Communist Revolution evicted the Kuomintang, yet the
Republic of China still retained the UN seat at that time, which
represented a clear violation of the state succession principle,
according to Zhou.147 Zhou asserted that the representation of
the PRC in the UN is not an issue of a new country joining the
United Nations, but rather a matter of reinstating the rights and
status of China as a founding member state.148 This point was
in line with PRC policies at that time.149 The PRC is not a
country that became independent from another state or an
independent country that resulted from colonial liberation, so
there should be no need to look at whether the United Nations
accepts the PRC as a new member state.150 The PRC also

Response to the World Bank Discussion Paper on Odious Debts, 48 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 59, 60–62 (2008) (discussing the forgiveness of odious debts by
the United States and Norway, among others). See generally Emily F. Mancina,
Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God: Resurrecting the Odious Debt Doctrine
in International Law, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1239 (2004) (providing a
modern normative argument for forgiveness of odious debts).
144. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 157.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 158.
149. See China Asks for Nothing, supra note 24.
150. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 159.
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inherited all the property and assets previously owned by China
before its liberation.151
4.

States’ Basic Rights and Duties

Chapter Four continued on by discussing states’ basic rights
and duties as embodied in the PRC’s Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence contained in the 1954 Agreement between the
Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade
and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India:
1. mutual respect for each other’s territorial
integrity and sovereignty,
2. mutual non-aggression,
3. mutual non-interference in each other’s
internal affairs,
4. equality and mutual benefit, and
5. peaceful co-existence.152
Yet again, Zhou spent a considerable amount of energy
comparing the PRC’s and imperialist approaches, emphasizing
the PRC’s peaceful approach compared to the more aggressive,
interfering Western approach.153
Zhou again quoted
Oppenheim, this time in relation to his definition of
intervention, and then he provided an interesting analysis of
that definition, asserting that intervention is allowed by right
and on humanitarian grounds.154 The notion of humanitarian
intervention was relatively common in Western international
law literature during this time, even though not all agreed with
it being a valid basis for intervention.155
Interestingly,
151. See id. at 160.
152. Agreement (with Exchange of Notes) on Trade and Intercourse
between Tibet Region of China and India, China-India, Apr. 29, 1954,
1958 U.N.T.S.
4307,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20299/v299.pdf.
153. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 189–90.
154. See id. at 190.
155. Compare Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND
CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217 (John Norton Moore ed. 1974), with
Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a
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Oppenheim’s International Law recognized the existence of the
notion of humanitarian intervention while at the same time
observing that the UN Charter “expressly rules out intervention
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of the States.”156 Therefore, it would appear that Zhou diverges
dramatically from Oppenheim’s International Law on this point.
Zhou elaborated that there were direct and indirect forms of
intervention, with the former involving military force,
propaganda and resolutions of international organizations, and
the latter involving financial assistance, such as with the
Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine.157
Zhou then
emphasized the PRC’s commitment to non-intervention, in
terms of interference both in other states’ affairs and in PRC
affairs, citing Indian’s intervention in Tibet and the U.S.
intervention in Taiwan as two examples.158 This point was in
line with PRC policies at that time, although the earlier part
about intervention being allowed on humanitarian grounds
certainly was not in line with PRC policies,159 and it is
inconsistent with what Zhou wrote later in the book. 160
Therefore, this would suggest either his views or the PRC’s
policies (or both) concerning intervention were complex during
this time period, or that he mistakenly said humanitarian
intervention was allowed when he meant to assert that states
often (improperly) rely on humanitarian grounds when they
intervene. Other commentators during this time period seem to
have recognized the PRC’s approach to humanitarian
intervention as being complex and dependent on the exact
circumstances involved.161 However, in support of the latter
Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN
WORLD 229 (John Norton Moore ed. 1974). See generally BRENDAN SIMMS &
DAVID J.B. TRIM, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A HISTORY (2011); FERNANDO
R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY
(2d ed. 1996).
156. OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 312–13.
157. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 190–91.
158. See id. at 192–93.
159. See Xiaoping, supra note 62; The U.S. Imperialism Takes the
Advantages of the United Nations to Commit the Crime of Aggression [美帝国
主义利用联合国进行侵略的罪行], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Jan. 9, 1965.
160. See infra pt. III(6).
161. See Qi Zhang, The Changing China and Humanitarian Intervention
[变革的中国与人道主义干预], 2015 CNKI [世界经济与政治: 世界政治] 103–112
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view, Zhou went on to analyze the non-aggression principle
established by the UN Charter and then observed the lack of
commitment to this principle among imperialists, giving the
example of U.S. aggression in Korea and Taiwan and ridiculing
the UN accusations that the PRC could be an invader.162 Zhou
distinguished PRC actions in Korea from U.S. actions by saying
the PRC’s actions had involved countering military intervention
and, therefore, was not military intervention per se.163 Zhou
asserted that this was in line with the PRC’s non-aggression
principle,164 which extended to territories of other countries,
including where the Kuomintang is located.165 As already noted
above, this last point seems so different from PRC policy at that
time (and even now) that it arguably stands as the best evidence
of Zhou’s independence, as careful censors surely would not have
allowed such a significant concession.
Moving on to equality and mutual benefit, Zhou analyzed
unequal treaties and advocated for their cancellation in order to
end the oppression and exploitation of Chinese people, instead
insisting on reciprocity in accordance with international law. 166
Zhou identified how Western approaches to international law
focus on equality in form, not in practice, which he deemed
inadequate.167 He cited the example of the Sino-American
Commercial Treaty of 1946 between the United States and the
Kuomintang, which appeared on its face to be equal but
ultimately was unequal due to the unequal economic power of
the two parties at the time of negotiation that gave the United
States greater benefits than China under this treaty. 168

(2015).
162. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 201–04.
163. See id. at 204–05.
164. See Xiaoping, supra note 62; Jing Wang, The People’s Republic of
China’s Exploration in Peaceful Settlement of Taiwan Problem in the Early
Years [建国初期中国政府为和平解决台湾问题所作的探索], 1994 BEIJING PARTY
HIST. RES. CTR. [北京党史研究] 21–27 (1994); Shizhu Zhu, Responding to the
Changing Situation, Peace is the Most Precious [因应变局， 以和为贵], 1998
HUAIYIN NORMAL UNIV. J. [淮阴师范学报] 30–33 (1998).
165. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 205.
166. See id. at 213–14.
167. See id. at 214.
168. See id.

33

ARTICLE 10_FRY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1024
a.

PACE LAW REVIEW

8/23/2019 6:47 PM

Vol. 39.2

Jurisdiction

Concerning jurisdiction, Zhou criticized the United States’
garrison policies in South Korea and Japan, which led to offences
committed by garrison troops not punishable due to
extraterritoriality.169 Zhou compared this with the Polish-Soviet
Treaty of 1956 where the Soviet Garrison was under the
jurisdiction of the Polish courts rather than enjoying
extraterritoriality.170 Zhou further stated that it would be more
reasonable for the foreign state to recognize the absolute
jurisdiction of the state being garrisoned to preserve the
territorial sovereignty of the state being garrisoned.171 He felt
that having a garrison in a foreign state is abnormal, as it would
harm the jurisdiction of the state being garrisoned, and such
harm should be eliminated as soon as possible.172 The Chinese
Volunteers in the Korean War withdrew in 1958, and yet U.S.
troops have stayed in South Korea until now.173 This not only
damages South Korea’s sovereignty, but also threatens other
states, which is clearly unacceptable in contemporary
international law.174 Of course, Zhou did not explore how South
Korea’s consent to having the U.S. troops remain in South Korea
impacts his assertion of damage to sovereignty.
b.

State Responsibility

Concerning state responsibility, Zhou asserted that, while
states enjoy rights, they also have a duty not to infringe other
states’ enjoyment of their rights.175 This point was in line with
PRC policies at that time,176 and reflected the mainstream,
169. See id. at 220–21.
170. See id.
171. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 220–21.
172. See id. at 221.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 233.
176. See Xiaoping, supra note 62; Authentic Friendly-Equal Diplomatic
Relations, supra note 141; see also Geneva Conference Continued to Discuss the
Korea Issues, Premier Zhou Enlai Made Important Speech and Supported the
Unification of Korea [日内瓦会议继续讨论朝鲜问题 周恩来外长作重要发言 并支
持南日关于恢复朝鲜统一的建议], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Apr. 30, 1954.
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state-centered approach to international law at that time as
well.177 Oppenheim’s International Law shared these same
mainstream views.178 A breach of this duty would be considered
as international delinquency, which may trigger state
responsibility,179 which again was reflected in the Western
international law literature at that time.180 Oppenheim’s
International Law also shared these views.181
Zhou
acknowledged that the PRC would strongly protest and ask for
a determination of state responsibility when the rights and
interests of the PRC are infringed, especially when they are
infringed by imperialist states.182
For infringement on territorial integrity, the PRC had
protested strongly the U.S. military intervention in Taiwan and
had filed a complaint to the United Nations in 1950.183 In the
same year, the PRC also protested against the U.S. infringement
on the airspace of China during the Korean War.184 Two
requests were made to the United States: (1) to punish the US
Air Force for the atrocities it committed; and (2) to seek
compensation for all losses suffered by the PRC.185 Another
occasion where the PRC protested in order to defend its
territorial integrity was when the PRC protested France’s
invasion of Vietnam in 1950, especially since French troops
occasionally took military actions at the borders between China
and Vietnam, which caused casualties of Chinese troops and
civilians.186
For infringement on national dignity, the PRC protested
against the Japanese Nobusuke Kishi government for insulting

177. See, e.g., STARKE, supra note 55, pt. 3 (entitled “Rights and Duties of
States”); SWIFT, supra note 55, at 535–39
178. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 259–61.
179. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 233.
180. See, e.g., STARKE, supra note 55, at 330–31; see also Eduardo Jiménez
de Aréchaga, International Responsibility, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 531, 540 (Max Sørensen ed., 1968).
181. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 345–47.
182. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 233.
183. See id. at 241–42.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
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the national flag of the PRC in Nagasaki, Japan.187 In addition,
the PRC government also protested when the Vietnamese
government forced the Chinese immigrants there to change
nationality.188 All of these examples show Zhou’s determination
to portray China’s policies and positions in the best light
possible.
5.

Residents

Chapter Five focuses on various aspects of how
international law impacts residents of a state. Concerning
nationality, Zhou noted how the PRC adopted the principle of jus
sanguinis (or right of blood) when determining the nationality of
a person, as opposed to the jus soli principle.189 This point was
in line with PRC policies at that time,190 and it also was in line
with Western international law textbooks at that time, although
they used the Latin phrase but said the nationality was through
the parents, not through blood per se.191 Similarly, Oppenheim’s
International Law mentioned nationality by birth, but again it
was not framed in terms of a right of blood per se.192 Some
commentators see the acquiring of Chinese nationality by birth
and by blood as separate.193 This distinction might suggest more
of a racial element to China’s approach to nationality
determinations, although more research on this point is needed.
In any event, this point emphasizes a difference between
Oppenheim’s International Law and Zhou’s book, even if small.
The PRC law recognized not only the male line for nationality

187. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 242–43.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 265.
190. See Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和
国国籍法] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong., effective
Sep. 10, 1980) art. 4–5.
191. See, e.g., LEVI, supra note 55, at 150–51; SCHWARZENBERGER &
BROWN, supra note 55, at 113.
192. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 651–52.
193. See Ronald C. Brown, China’s Employment Discrimination Laws
During Economic Transition, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 361, 386–87 (2006).
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purposes, but also the female line,194 which was more
progressive than that of Canada at that time, for example.195
On a foreigner’s entry and exit of a state, Zhou asserted
that this is a matter entirely within a state’s sovereignty.196 A
state may, for security or other legitimate reasons, refuse entry
of a foreigner.197 Zhou asserted that, in practice, only people
with mental illness, an infectious disease or a criminal record
could be refused entry.198 Zhou emphasized that it would be an
international problem if a state were to refuse entry of a person
based on their race or nationality.199 Examples that Zhou gave
involve past U.S. anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese immigration
policies.200 Such race discrimination would harm the friendship
between states, undermine the other’s national dignity and
violate the equality principle.201 These points were in line with
PRC policies at that time.202 These points were progressive in
light of prior Western policies, which involved a right of states
to deny foreigners access to their territory as well as to expel
them from their territory, with some exceptions.203 This view
was reflected in Oppenheim’s International Law.204 As with the
fight of ex-colonies for independence, it is not clear from the
available evidence what the PRC’s exact policy was on this
particular point during this time. There is no record indicating
194. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 265.
195. See Karen Knop & Christine Chinkin, Remembering Chrystal
MacMillian: Women’s Equality and Nationality in International Law, 22 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 523, 579–81 (2001) (citing, inter alia, Benner v. Canada (Secretary
of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358).
196. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 275–76.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 276.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Frontier
Inspection of Exit from or Entry Into the Country [中华人民共和国出境入境检查
条例], GAZETTE STATE COUNCIL PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CHINA [中华人民共和国国务
院公报], Sept. 1, 1995 (effective); Frontier Inspection Regulation [边防检查条例
], Apr. 30, 1965 (ceasing to be effective).
203. See, e.g., DANIEL C. TURACK, THE PASSPORT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
233–34 (1972); BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 519; GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 3–83
(1978).
204. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 675–95.
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that the PRC ever refused the entry of people of a certain race
or nationality. Moreover, following the PRC’s style of peaceful
and friendly diplomacy, it can be surmised that the PRC would
not refuse entry of a particular race. Nevertheless, there is no
clear and official declaration of the PRC stating that China
would definitely not deny the entry of certain races. Therefore,
it is difficult to say whether Zhou’s assertion was in line with
PRC policy.
Concerning extradition, Zhou observed that a consensus
existed among capitalist states that political prisoners are not to
be extradited.205 However, the Inter-American Convention of
Extradition of 1933 gave a state that was requested to extradite
the right to decide whether a certain prisoner is a political
prisoner or not.206 Some states may then, for their own benefits,
abuse the extradition law or distort the meaning of political
offense.207 Zhou asserted that this is how imperialist states
extradite political prisoners who fought for national liberation
or otherwise protect their own criminals.208
6.

Territory

This Chapter introduced various aspects of territory,
including land, territorial waters, territorial seas and territorial
airspace. While Zhou analyzed all kinds of theories and
reviewed the historical development of those theories in great
detail, one proposition remains the same for all aspects of
territory: no state’s territorial integrity should be undermined.
Any intrusion to a country’s territory would be an issue of
sovereignty and would be against international law. This point
was in line with PRC policies at that time.209 Zhou also gave
examples to support his criticism of imperialist aggression, such
205. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 311.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See The Warship of the United States Invaded Our Territorial Sea
Twice, the People’s Republic of China Issued 356th Serious Warning [美国军舰
两次入侵中国领海，中国提出严重警告], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Jan. 11,
1965; The Government of the People’s Republic of China Made Statement
Severely Condemning that the US Imperialism Expanding the War [我国政府
发表声明强烈谴责美帝扩大战火], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Jan. 13, 1965.
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as the Suez Canal and Panama Canal incidents. In addition,
Zhou interpreted the theories that the United States and other
Western states adopted with regard to territory, such as the 3mile territorial sea rule and the freedom of the outer space, as
strategic moves to restrict other states’ development.
a.

Theories of Territory

Although a state is, under national law, not the proprietor
of the land it rules, it is, under international law, both ruler and
proprietor.210 Zhou thought that théorie du territoire object is
incorrect because it does not recognize the ruler as the proprietor
of land.211 Instead, the theory contends that the state only rules
the people on the territory and not the territory itself.212 If a
state only rules the people on the territory, it leaves open the
question about those territories without people living on them. 213
Théorie du territoire-limite suggests that territory is the
material boundary within which a state may exercise its
powers.214 This is a negative way of looking at territory.215 In
fact, according to Zhou, territory does not negatively limit the
ambit of a state’s powers.216
A state can, according to
international law, exercise powers outside of its territory.217 An
example would include the ability of states to arrest pirates on
the high seas,218 just as states also can exercise jurisdiction over
their ships while they are on the high seas.219 This point was in
line with PRC policies at that time,220 and it was in line with
Western international law literature at that time as well.221
210. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 322.
211. See id. at 321.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 322.
215. See id.
216. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 322.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See The Statement of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the
Territorial Sea [中华人民共和国政府关于领海的声明], LAW SCI. [法学], Sept. 4,
1958 [hereinafter Territorial Sea].
221. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 55, at 104–06; BROWNLIE, supra note
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Zhou then cited Hans Kensen’s théorie de la compétence,
which says that territory falls within the ambit of states’ powers
as defined by international law.222 This theory denies the
concept of sovereignty of a state or proposes that international
law is higher than sovereignty, which undermines the concept of
sovereignty and which is consistent with Western, capitalist
approaches to international law.223 Zhou emphasized how this
theory even proposes that the territories of two or more states
may overlap with each other, which he saw as essentially an
excuse for imperialism and colonialism.224
Concerning fictional parts of territory, or territoire fictif,
warships or other ships on the high seas are the “floating parts”
of a state’s territory, which Zhou saw as far-fetched and
unacceptable inasmuch as one of the main features of territory
is its fixed nature.225 Also, it is impossible for the water
surrounding a ship to be the territory of the flag state of that
ship.226 Nevertheless, Zhou acknowledged that territories of a
state can be separated, such as East and West Pakistan.227 Some
states can have a territory that is completely surrounded by
territories of other countries, which is called an enclave. 228
States with coasts can have island territories, such as the many
islands of the PRC, including Taiwan.229 This point was in line
with PRC policies at that time.230
Zhou took a step back and explored the social and political
significance of territory,231 which was considerably original
among international law commentaries at that time. In its
55, at 243-47; HARRIS, supra note 55, at 351–52; SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN,
supra note 55, at 75–76; STARKE, supra note 55, at 309–12; SWIFT, supra note
55, at 202, 213–14.
222. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 323.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 324.
226. See id.
227. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 324.
228. See id. at 324–25.
229. See id.
230. See The Asian and African People Would Not Tolerate the Gun-Boat
Policy of the US, the “Pioneer” in Myanmar Severely Condemned the US for
Intervening in China’s Internal Affairs [亚非人民不会容忍美国的”炮舰政策” 缅
甸”先锋报”谴责美国干涉中国内政], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Sept. 2, 1958.
231. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 325–26.
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social meaning, territory is the foundation of a state.232 A state’s
territory is fixed, and residents of that state can exploit the
resources on that territory in perpetuity.233 Therefore, territory
is the foundation for the development of a state.234 In its political
meaning, territory is where a state may freely exercise its
powers, based on the exclusivity of territory.235 That means a
state may independently exercise its powers within its territory
without any impediment and may exclude any competition and
interference from the outside.236 Therefore, a state may, in
accordance with its people’s will, arrange state affairs and
control the destination of the state.237 If, following the théorie de
la compétence that states may only act in accordance with
international law, then states may not exercise their powers
freely on their territory.238 If territories can overlap, then
territories lose their exclusivity, and so the théorie de la
compétence clearly is wrong, as it removes the meaning of
territory and it does not comply with international law.239 In
fact, according to Zhou, states act on their territory according to
their sovereignty, and they do not acquire authority from
international law.240 As a result, states must not interfere with
other states’ sovereignty over their own territories.241
This law fits with the interests of states within their
international relations.242
Nevertheless, states that have
adopted a system of imperialism and colonialism never respect
other states’ sovereignty and would make excuses to invade
other states’ territories and destroy their completeness.243 Zhou
sees this as the main cause for international disputes and wars
that threaten world peace.244
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

See id. at 325.
See id.
See id. at 325–26.
See id. at 326.
See id.
See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 326.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 326.
See id.
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Territorial Waters

Zhou relied on a series of examples to explain the
international law relating to territorial waters. First, the Suez
Canal used to be a neutral zone under the Convention of
Constantinople Treaty of 1888, but it came under British control
in 1914, and subsequently became a tool of British imperialism
policy.245 In the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, the United
Kingdom agreed to withdraw all of its troops from Egypt and
recognized the Suez Canal as part of Egypt, but the treaty also
stipulated that the Suez Canal would remain an important
passage of the British Empire.246 In 1956, the Egyptian
government privatized the Suez Canal and fought against the
British and French armies, and Egypt was able to regain control
and sovereignty over the Suez Canal with the help of peaceful
states and peoples around the world.247
Zhou’s next example was the Panama Canal.
He
emphasized how the United States pushed for Panama’s
Declaration of Independence in 1908, then recognized Panama
as a state three days after the Declaration and quickly signed
the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with Panama to allow the United
States to use, possess and control the Canal.248 The Canal
became neutral and open for other states to use in 1914. 249
However, Zhou pointed out that the United States violated the
neutrality principle and equality principle by building
strongholds near the Canal and waiving taxes for U.S. ships, all
of which he saw as ignoring Panama’s sovereignty.250 The people
of Panama opposed U.S. rule over the Canal, and they
eventually demanded the United States to leave in 1964,251 with
the Panamanian government eventually taking back
management of the Canal.252 Zhou emphasized how the PRC
showed support to the Egyptians in the Suez Crisis and the
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

See id. at 346–47.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 348–50.
See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 348–50.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Panamanian people in taking back control over the Canal in
1956 and 1964, respectively.253
c.

Territorial Sea

Zhou recognized that different states have different limits
on their territorial seas, such as Sweden and Norway with four
miles, Spain and Portugal with six miles, Mexico with nine miles
and Russia with twelve miles.254 Zhou cited Rousseau when
asserting that international practice is that states may set this
limit by their discretion.255 This point was in line with PRC
policies at that time.256 Numerous Western international law
commentators reflected this variety in approaches and
indeterminacy with the breadth of territorial seas, and it is
difficult to say that there was one established limit under
customary international law at that time.257 In any event,
Oppenheim’s International Law did not discuss these specific
limits,258 presumably because it predated these other Western
international law books by over a year, before the controversy
had come to a head. As with the Western commentators, Zhou
noted that the United Kingdom and the United States insisted
on the 3-mile limit rule, both in their national laws and in
treaties.259 Both were opposed to other states having more than
three miles, and they especially objected to the twelve-mile limit
based on strategic and economic considerations.260 For example,
when other states expand their territorial seas, the UK and U.S.
fleets’ activities on the high seas are limited, especially when it

253. See id. at 350.
254. See id. at 358–59.
255. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 358–59.
256. See Territorial Sea, supra note 220.
257. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 191–99; HARRIS, supra note
55, at 310–11; LEVI, supra note 55, at 137–38; SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN,
supra note 55, at 100–05 (6th ed. 1976); STARKE, supra note 55, at 226–31;
SWIFT, supra note 55, at 263–69. But see BROWN, supra note 55, at 95 (“The
extent of the territorial waters or territorial sea is decided by the power to
which they belong, and varies from State to State”).
258. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 69, 587–89.
259. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 358–59.
260. See id.
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comes to combating enemies’ submarines in wartime.261 They
also see this twelve-mile rule as impeding the passing of
commercial ships and airplanes, as well as harming their fishing
efforts.262 Zhou observed that this imperialist strategy is evident
from the recent Vienna Law of the Sea Conference.263
Zhou explained that there are two schools of thought on the
limits of territorial seas.264 The first is the three-mile-limit
theory adopted by states with strong navies, such as the United
States and the United Kingdom, as well as Germany and Japan
in the past, which does not allow other states to freely expand
their territorial seas.265 Another theory is Rousseau’s theory
where all states have the right to set limits for their own
territorial seas and that there is no set limit on the territorial
seas,266 as already mentioned above. Zhou emphasized that the
three-mile limit previously adopted by China was never
recognized since the establishment of the PRC.267 The PRC
established its territorial sea system in 1958, which Zhou noted
remained at a twelve-mile limit at the time of his writing. 268
This point was in line with PRC policies at that time.269
d.

Airspace

Zhou asserted that the PRC firmly defends its airspace,
indicating that foreign aircraft may not trespass into the PRC’s
airspace without permission.270 As an example, Zhou pointed to
how the PRC shot down a U.S. military aircraft that trespassed
into the airspace over the northeast of China during the Korean

261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 359.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 380.
268. See id.
269. See The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of
People’s Republic of China Ratified the Statement Concerning the Territorial
Sea [我人大常委会批准我政府关于领海的声明], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Sept.
5, 1958; Territorial Sea, supra note 220.
270. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 405.
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War, with the U.S. soldiers aboard the aircraft being convicted
and imprisoned.271
In addition to defending its airspace, Zhou highlighted how
the PRC also built its civil aviation routes to foreign countries
primarily through the Warsaw Convention of 1929, not the
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944.272
In particular, Zhou observed that the routes that the PRC
developed with foreign states were based on reciprocity and were
concluded through negotiation.273 This point was in line with
PRC policies at that time.274 It was noticeably different from the
effort at the time to bring about greater multilateral cooperation
concerning aviation routes.275
e.

Outer Space

Zhou stressed that the United States pretends to believe
that outer space does not belong to any state but is common
space for all states to use because the United States is more
advanced in terms of space technology.276 Zhou believed that
such a theory would allow the United States to unacceptably
dominate outer space.277 The result of this is that the territorial
airspace of other states is undermined or violated.278 From
Zhou’s perspective, the correct view of outer space was that
international law did not limit the height of a state’s territorial
space, going out indefinitely into space.279 Therefore, until there
is an international convention that regulates outer space, all
countries should preserve their exclusive right to their
territorial airspace, which includes outer space.280 It would
appear that international law at that time had not yet settled
the question of where territorial airspace ends and where outer
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See Authentic Friendly-Equal Diplomatic Relations, supra note 141.
See generally H.A. WASSENBERGH, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORTATION LAW IN A NEW ERA (1976).
276. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 413.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See id.
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space begins,281 and so Zhou was not expressly going against
established international law according to Western textbooks on
this point.
7.

Territory Continued

Zhou’s Chapter Seven continued with a detailed analysis of
territory concerning boundaries. In general, Zhou opposed the
theory of natural boundaries on the basis that its ambiguity
provided states with an excuse to expand their territories. With
regard to resolving boundary disputes, Zhou stated that the
PRC’s method of resolving disputes is through peaceful
negotiation, and he gave examples of some recently concluded
treaties with the PRC’s neighbors. Concerning the acquisition
of land, Zhou emphasized various methods of land acquisition,
including annexation, conquest, res nullius and cession.
Interestingly, Zhou disagreed with all of these methods of
territorial acquisition on the grounds of their illegality and
unfairness. Zhou strongly criticized all of these methods in this
chapter, along with the imperialist states that have promoted
these methods.
a.

Boundaries

When setting a boundary or a frontier, Zhou asserted that
the two states have discretion in deciding where to set the
boundary.282 This point was in line with PRC policy at that
time.283 Western international law commentators tend not to
281. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 122 (recognizing unresolved
issues concerning the outer limits of sovereignty); LEVI, supra note 55, at 136–
37 (recognizing as valid one theory (among others) that territorial airspace had
an unlimited height, but also asking the question of how far upwards does a
state’s territorial airspace extend, without answering the question);
OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 517–18 (citing J.C. Cooper, High Altitude Flights
and National Sovereignty, 4 INT’L L.Q. 411 (1951)) (recognizing same); STARKE,
supra note 55, at 195–204 (recognizing same). But see BROWN, supra note 55,
at 93 (implying that the sovereign airspace is limited to the atmosphere);
SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra note 55, at 76, 100 (implying the same).
282. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 422.
283. See Boundary Treaty Between the People’s Republic of China and the
President of the Union of Burma, CHINA-MYAN., Oct. 1, 1960, CIARDP08C01297R000100190005-8, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/doc
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specifically say that territorial boundaries were based on states
using their discretion when deciding the boundary, although
that can be implied from the discussion of boundaries, with the
possible exception being when natural boundaries such as rivers
change their location.284
Oppenheim’s International Law
appears to follow this general approach in the international law
literature.285 If two states are separated by a mountain, the
boundary can be set at the ridge, the watershed or the foothill. 286
If the boundary is set at the foothill, the whole of the mountain
will become territory of one of the states.287 For example, before
British India created the McMahon Line, the boundary between
Tibet and India was at the south foothill of the Himalayas, and
so part of Chinese territory was illegally ceded by the McMahon
Line.288
Zhou noted that, in international relations, there is a theory
of determining state boundaries by looking at natural
boundaries, such as mountains or rivers.289 Zhou asserted that
such a theory clearly would be a political one because it reflects
expansionist policies.290 For example, in a meeting between the
Chinese and Indian officials regarding the Sino-Indian Boarder
Issue, India proposed to adopt the natural boundary theory,
which would have enabled India’s expansionist policy. 291
b.

Border Dispute Resolution

Zhou pointed out that, since the establishment of the PRC,
the PRC proposed to resolve border issues with its neighboring
states through negotiation.292 For example, by the mid-1960s,
the PRC had resolved its border disputes with Afghanistan,
s/CIA-RDP08C01297R000100190005-8.pdf.
284. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 55, at 94; BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at
127–28. But see STARKE, supra note 55, at 217 (noting how boundaries can be
“generally acknowledged without express declaration”).
285. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 530–35.
286. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 422.
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See id. at 426.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 429.
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Burma, Mongolia, Nepal and Pakistan through negotiated
border treaties, with the exceptions of the Sino-Soviet border
negotiation that still was on-going and the Sino-India border
negotiation where India was refusing to negotiate.293
c.

Acquisition of Territory

Zhou analyzed various methods of acquiring territory.
Starting with annexation, he pointed out that acquisition
through the natural increase of land, such as a delta formed in
a river or a new island that emerged from sea, is obviously
legal.294 However, some annexations may be artificial, such as
building a dam on a river or by the shore to expand the boundary
of a country, which would be illegal if the consent of the state on
the other side was not received.295 Such detailed analysis of this
area of international law seems overwhelmingly original among
commentaries at that time.
Concerning terra nullius, Zhou noted that Western jurists
generally regard this as a primitive way of acquiring territory. 296
He then asserted that it is entirely a political arrangement that
enables or justifies acts of aggression by colonizing states.297
Zhou speculated that this method of acquisition would become
less common in the future as there was not much terra nullius
left.298 Zhou did not state what territories still could be
considered terra nullius. Regardless, Zhou concluded that this
method of acquisition is illegal because it ignores the claims of
the indigenous populations there, which leads to a violation of
human rights and the principle of self-determination.299 This
point was in line with PRC policies at that time.300 However,
this went against Western international law textbooks from this
time, which recognized territorial acquisition through discovery
293. See id.
294. See id. at 445–46.
295. See id.
296. See id. at 446–47.
297. See id.
298. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 446–47.
299. See id.
300. See Superstitious Beliefs, supra note 20, at 1; Resist Aggression,
Peaceful Coexistence, supra note 73.
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as legal, as long as the discoverer showed evidence of actually
taking possession and control of that territory.301 Oppenheim’s
International Law is included among those textbooks.302 This
does not necessarily mean that international law is not evolving
or will not evolve in the direction of voiding prior instances of
territorial acquisition through discovery.303
When it comes to conquest, Zhou dismissed it as being an
excuse for aggression and expansion.304 Zhou believed there was
no legitimate reason to justify conquest.305 With cession, Zhou
described it as an unconditional mandatory transfer of land,
which typically happens through treaties that result from
war.306 Zhou said that cession had been recognized as a
legitimate way of acquiring territory under international law,
although its legitimacy should be reconsidered.307
Zhou
recognized that Article 2 of the UN Charter allows for cession of
territory, so it would be legitimate even if that cession was a
result of war.308 However, he asserted that there is disguised
cession, which is a de facto form of cession that actually is an
occupation.309 Such an arrangement would constitute an
imperialist form of aggression.310 One cannot say that the
original state loses sovereignty over this territory in such a
situation.311 This point was in line with PRC policies at that
time.312 Zhou gave the example of the PRC taking back its
301. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 149–50; SWIFT, supra note 55,
at 121–23 (but noting that discovery is of limited importance now because of
the current lack of terra nullius). But see SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra
note 55, at 97 (noting that discovery leads to an inchoate title).
302. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 558–59.
303. See generally Danielle C. Davis, Land in the Second Decade: The
Evolution of Indigenous Property Rights and the Energy Industry in the United
States and Brazil, 34 ENERGY L.J. 667 (2013); Kent McNeil, Self-Government
and the Inalienability of Aboriginal Title, 47 MCGILL L.J. 473 (2002).
304. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 449–50.
305. See id.
306. See id. at 451–52.
307. See id.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 453–54.
310. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 453–54.
311. See id.
312. See Authentic Friendly-Equal Diplomatic Relations, supra note 141;
Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference [中
国人民政治协商会议共同纲领], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Sept. 30, 1949.
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previously leased lands except for Kowloon in Hong Kong.313 In
places like Panama, where the people demanded the return of
territorial control to the original state, Zhou asserted that the
state that engaged in the disguised cession would not be able to
continue to occupy the territory in question, such as the Panama
Canal.314 Zhou denigrated imperialist states’ efforts to create
spheres of influence in order to create a connection to a piece of
territory, especially in China, and concluded that such efforts
cannot be justified.315
Zhou interestingly observed that these methods of
territorial acquisition came from Roman law relating to
privatizing property, which reflects contemporary imperialist
and colonialist sentiments.316 Contemporary international law
now prohibits acquisition through conquest, and the
completeness of a state’s territory must remain intact.317
8.

The High Seas

This chapter on the high seas essentially is descriptive in
nature. In it, Zhou provided a review of the legal history and the
laws that concern the high seas. Zhou did not express many
opinions or otherwise criticize any particular legal principles,
which was different from the prior chapters that contained much
criticism. Therefore, this Article moves on to more interesting
analysis by Zhou.
9.

Diplomatic Relations

Chapter Nine on diplomatic relations essentially outlined
the PRC policy at that time. In particular, it set out the
requirements for the PRC to build diplomatic relationships with
other countries: (1) renounce relationships with the
Kuomintang; and (2) adopt a friendly attitude towards the PRC.
Diplomatic relations were to be formed through negotiation with
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 453–54.
See id.
See id. at 455–56.
See id. at 456.
See id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/10

50

ARTICLE 10_FRY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

8/23/2019 6:47 PM

MAO-ERA INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP

1041

the PRC, based on the principles of equality, reciprocity and
mutual respect of each other’s territory and sovereignty. This
Chapter also analyzed other unofficial forms of diplomatic
relationships such as semi-diplomatic relationships and citizen
diplomacy. This point on renouncing relationships was in line
with PRC policies at that time.318 These conditions for entering
into diplomatic relations with the PRC seem reasonable, given
the politics at the time.
Zhou started by observing that diplomatic relationships
between states can take various forms.319 The most common
form is a formal and thorough diplomatic relationship, although
there also are semi-diplomatic relationships that are mainly
through civilians.320 For formal diplomatic relationships, the
main characteristic is when both states send their diplomats to
the other, and the relationship is based on sovereign equality
and mutual consent.321 This basis for diplomatic relations seems
well established in the Western literature on international law
at that time, including Oppenheim’s International Law,
although the connection between diplomatic relations and
equality usually is not mentioned in the same section.322 Zhou
observed that the PRC has its own way of commencing a
diplomatic relationship with another country. For example,
there are certain conditions and procedures that must be
satisfied, which are specified in the Common Program of The
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in Article 56:
All those foreign governments who renounce their
relationships with the Kuomintang and adopt a
friendly attitude towards the PRC may negotiate
with the PRC government to establish diplomatic
relationship, on the basis of equality, reciprocal

318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

See Authentic Friendly-Equal Diplomatic Relations, supra note 141.
See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 506–07.
See id.
See id.
See, e.g., OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 22–23, 263–67;
SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra note 55, at 52–53, 59–60; STARKE, supra
note 55, at 122–29. But see BROWN, supra note 55, at 35–36 (1970) (making an
express connection between diplomatic relations and equality).
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relationship and mutual respect on each other’s
territory and sovereignty.
Zhou noted that, although it seems unreasonable to make
diplomatic relationships conditional, these conditions were
necessary, reasonable and practical from the perspective of the
PRC after liberation.323 This was because the PRC government
would not tolerate a country that had established diplomatic
relations with the PRC to stay in touch with the Kuomintang
situated in Taiwan, which would give rise to the “Two Chinas”
situation and which would need a process of negotiation in order
to resolve it.324
Concerning half-diplomatic relationships, Zhou described
this as when both parties stay at the stage of sending chargé
d’affaires to each other.325 Zhou gave the example of the SinoBritish relationship and Sino-Dutch relationship for a long
while, which was abnormal.326 Almost as an aside, Zhou
observed that unofficial diplomatic relations would be something
akin to Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Talks.327 Finally, citizen
diplomacy included visits of individuals and civil groups, where
these entities might be able to reach a certain consensus on
particular matters and perhaps even make a joint declaration,
which would be a type of creative diplomacy.328
10. Treaty Law
Chapter Ten started by introducing the three conditions for
a treaty: (1) the full qualification of the contracting state; (2)
voluntary consent; and (3) legality and possible purpose. Zhou
accused imperialist states of breaching their treaty obligations,
and in any event, unequal treaties entered into under duress
would be void and unenforceable.
Concerning the three conditions for a treaty, Zhou
elaborated on the full qualification of the contracting state when
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 507.
See id.
See id. at 510-11.
See id.
See id. at 512.
See id. at 517.
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he asserted that only a state can make a treaty.329 Zhou
explained that Western jurists have categorized states into
sovereign states and half-sovereign states, which undermined
the rights of the latter group to make treaties.330 Zhou declared
this as being incorrect because half-sovereign states are the
result
of
colonialism
during
imperial
expansion.331
Nevertheless, half-sovereign states almost were non-existent at
the time of Zhou’s writing, and so he concluded that all states
could make treaties at that time.332 Zhou emphasized the states
in a federal form of government—such as Switzerland—could
make treaties in accordance with the constitution, but
administrative regions and autonomous regions in a unitary
state would have no right to make treaties.333 Zhou gave an
example of the Simla Accord in 1914, which the Chinese
government saw as void because the Tibet local government
signed it.334 With regard to the other conditions for a treaty,
Zhou asserted that treaties can be void for error, fraud and
duress, and that the rights and duties confirmed by the treaty
must be practical and legitimate.335
Zhou concluded with observations that imperialist states
always break the principle of adhering to treaties.336 He gave an
example of the United States breaking the Geneva Convention
in 1954 regarding the Indo-China dispute when it invaded
Vietnam,337 although he did not elaborate on the reasons for this.
Nevertheless, Zhou believed that there needs to be sanctions
against treaty breakers in order to preserve the enforceability of
treaties.338 At the same time, he observed that the obligation to
adhere to a treaty cannot be absolute because the nature and
existence of some treaties are special, and it might be
unreasonable or unjust to enforce particular treaties.339 Zhou
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 603.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 604–05.
See id. at 650.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 651.
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believed that such flexibility could be applied with the unequal
treaties that were forced upon weak states by imperialist states,
as well as treaties outdated due to changed circumstances. 340
11. International Organizations
Chapter Eleven on international organizations strongly
criticized the United States for manipulating the United Nations
in order to obstruct the PRC from returning to the United
Nations as the representative of China. This point was in line
with PRC policies at that time.341 In addition, Zhou pointed out
how the United States manipulated the United Nations to
initiate the Korean War and the military intervention in the
Congo. The Chapter also briefly introduced some regional
organizations, such as the Organization of American States, the
League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity, all
of which was relatively descriptive in nature.
Zhou saw international organizations as both platforms for
international cooperation as well as arena for international
struggles.342 In particular, he asserted that imperialists make
use of their status in international organizations in order to
interfere with the internal affairs and undermine the
sovereignty of other states.343 Zhou believed this inevitably
would result in opposition to an organization, such as U.S.
manipulation of the United Nations in order to promote the “Two
Chinas Scheme” that left the Chinese people with no choice but
to fight against the United Nations.344
Zhou shifted his attention to the League of Nations, which
had been founded in order to secure the fruits of victory of the
imperialist states after the First World War and implement
hostile policies against the Soviet Union.345 Zhou asserted that
the League of Nations had its weaknesses from the day it was
founded, including the constitutional exclusion of the Soviet
340. See id.
341. See China Asks for Nothing, supra note 24; Fundamental Problem,
supra note 23; Superstitious Beliefs, supra note 20.
342. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 687.
343. See id.
344. See id.
345. See id. at 689.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/10

54

ARTICLE 10_FRY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

8/23/2019 6:47 PM

MAO-ERA INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP

1045

Union and the United States, which left it lacking
representativeness.346
Interestingly, this assertion is not
actually reflected in the Covenant of the League of Nations, so it
is unclear why Zhou would make this assertion. In terms of its
organization and procedure, Zhou explained that the power of
the Council and the Assembly were unclear and that all the
resolutions required unanimous decision, which reduced the
organization’s flexibility.347 Zhou clarified that, since the
founding of the League, it had failed to perform its functions as
an international organization, especially during the expansion
of fascism in the 1930s, and it generally showed its incompetence
in keeping world peace.348 As an example, Zhou pointed to when
Japan invaded the northeast of China in 1931 and the League
did not take action, apart from sending an investigation team to
China, making a report and adopting a report that favored the
Japanese invaders.349 Zhou also pointed to Fascist Italy’s
invasion of Abyssinia, when the League only passed an
incomplete financial sanction, which resulted in Abyssinia being
conquered by Fascist Italy.350 Even though the Soviet Union
joined the League by 1934, the League failed to stop Nazi
Germany’s expansion within Europe, eventually leading to the
dissolution of the League.351
With regard to the United Nations, Zhou described how the
Security Council holds the most political significance, which it
uses to act against the UN’s principles and purposes.352 Zhou
elaborated that it failed to keep world peace, and it even
provided excuses for imperialist military invasions.353 For
example, the United Nations passed a resolution in 1950 to
establish a U.S.-led UN Command to start a war against Korea,
with another example being the UN’s military intervention into
the Congo in 1960.354 Turning his attention to the UN Secretary
General, he explained that, by nature, that position is only
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

See id. at 690–91.
See id.
See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 690–91.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 692.
See id. at 712.
See id.
See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 712.
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responsible for the administrative affairs of the United Nations,
although it also carries out some political missions.355 Zhou
went on to say that manipulation by U.S. imperialism often
leads the Secretary General to abuse power by interfering in
other states’ affairs.356 This point was in line with PRC policies
at that time.357
Zhou then analyzed UN Charter Article 103 concerning UN
Charter obligations prevailing over conflicting obligations,
pointing out that the rule concerned different conflicts: one
between member states’ Charter and treaty obligations, and
another between member states’ and non-member-states’
Charter and treaty obligations.358 Concerning the former
situation, the Charter obligation must prevail. Article 103 also
prevails in the second situation because a member state, being
a party of a multi-states treaty, cannot change its obligations
under the treaty unless other parties to the treaty agree. 359
Concerning the latter situation, Zhou said it is problematic
because the Charter has no effect on non-member states,
although some Western jurists argue that the Charter is a basic
law in international society and a social norm, so even nonmember states have to give way to it.360 Zhou concluded that
this argument exaggerates the effects of the Charter, rendering
it unconvincing.361
With regard to China’s representation within the United
Nations, Zhou explained that this has been a significant issue
since the PRC’s establishment.362 Zhou concluded that this was
a serious mistake inasmuch as China was a UN founding
member and permanent member of the Security Council, all of
which shows the importance of China in the United Nations. 363
Here, Zhou seemed to be asserting that China meant the

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

See id. at 720.
See id.
See An Ugly Drama, supra note 25; Look!, supra note 21.
See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 720–21.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 725.
See id.
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People’s Republic of China, that China had been disrespected by
its treatment within the United Nations, or both.
Zhou elaborated that Chinese people love peace, that China
supported the Allies during the Second World War and that the
establish of the Chinese Communist Party was by the peaceful
will of the Chinese people.364 This point obviously was in line
with PRC policies at that time,365 and it would emphasize the
democratic or representative elements of the People’s Republic
of China. As an example of China’s connection to the United
Nations, Zhou pointed out how, in 1945, before the San
Francisco Conference, Mao stated in an article:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) totally
agrees with the suggestions made in the
Dumbarton Oak Conference and the decision
made in the Crimea Conference. The CCP
welcomes the San Francisco Conference. The CCP
has sent its representative to attend the San
Francisco Conference to represent the will of the
Chinese people.366
Zhou explained that on October 1, 1949, Mao declared “this
government (the PRC government) is the only legitimate
government that represents the PRC’s people;” therefore, the
representatives of the Republic of China government who
attended the UN Conference were part of an exiled group that
did not represent the Chinese people.367 The PRC requested the
United Nations to disqualify the Republic of China
representatives, with other states like the Soviet Union
providing support for the PRC’s legitimate rights and status in
the United Nations.368 Zhou developed support for this point by
pointing to the support that other states, especially from Asian
and African states, have given the PRC within the United
364. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 726.
365. See Celebration of the Right of the People’s Republic of China is
Resumed [祝贺恢复我国在联合国的合法权利], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Oct.
31, 1971 [hereinafter Celebration].
366. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 726.
367. See id. at 727.
368. See id.
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Nations.369 Zhou concluded that the United Nations was
fundamentally wrong in the way it dealt with China’s
representation within the United Nations.370 Not only did the
United Nations violate the Charter, but it also ruined its
reputation inasmuch as the PRC was the only legitimate
government for China, and the United Nations excluded it due
to manipulation and misinterpretation of the UN Charter by the
United States.371
In particular, Zhou asserted that
reinstatement of the PRC’s legitimate rights within the United
Nations should be a procedural matter that did not require a
two-thirds majority vote in accordance with Article 18 of the UN
Charter.372
Just as the United States had manipulated the United
Nations in order to promote its own interests, Zhou asserted that
the United States manipulated the Organization of American
States in the name of the Monroe Doctrine.373 He pointed to the
declaration to oppose International Communism in 1954 and the
decision to expel Cuba from the Pan-American Union in 1962 as
examples.374 Zhou praised states such as Mexico that stood up
to the United States.375 Zhou similarly praised the League of
Arab States for standing up for Arab rights in Palestine and for
pushing back against British and American imperialist efforts
in Egypt and elsewhere.376 The Organization of African Unity
likewise defended equality and the protection of African
interests when supporting liberation of colonies, while at the
same time helping resolve disputes between member states,
such as the Algeria and Morocco border dispute and the Somalia
and Ethiopia border dispute.377 This acted as a useful segue into
the next chapter on the peaceful resolution of international
disputes.

369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

See id.
See id. at 747.
See id.
See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 747.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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12. Peaceful Resolution of International Disputes
Chapter Twelve on the peaceful resolution of international
disputes started with Zhou emphasizing the PRC’s commitment
to negotiated settlement of disputes, giving as examples the
border dispute between China and Burma in 1960 and the
border dispute between China and India on Tibet in 1954. 378
This point was in line with PRC policies at that time.379 Zhou
explained that, even with the U.S. government that had been
hostile towards the PRC in the past, the PRC still was willing to
negotiate with the United States to resolve the Taiwan issue,
with China-U.S. Ambassadorial talks having taken place in
Warsaw on that issue.380 This, too, was in line with PRC policies
at that time.381
On international arbitration, Zhou stated that the PRC
prefers direct negotiation over international arbitration.382 At
that time, most of the PRC’s foreign trade agreements did not
include an arbitration clause.383
Moreover, the use of
international arbitration with border disputes was seen as
particularly unsuitable because border disputes relate to
sovereignty and territorial integrity.384 Zhou pointed to the
Sino-Indian Border Dispute as an example, where the Indian
government insisted on handing the matter of interpretation of
the Simla Accord through international arbitration, whereas the
PRC preferred not to use international arbitration for such
matters that involved PRC internal affairs and sovereignty
issues.385
With regard to the International Court of Justice, Zhou
asserted that the system of electing judges tilted the process in
favor of Western imperialist states because they have double
378. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 760.
379. See Celebration, supra note 365; Guo Moruo Made a Speech
Concerning the Achievement of Asian-African Conference [中国人民保卫世界和
平委员会主席郭沫若 中国人民保卫世界和平委员会主席郭沫若], PEOPLE’S DAILY [
人民日报], May 8, 1955.
380. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 760.
381. See Authentic Friendly-Equal Diplomatic Relations, supra note 141.
382. See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 776–77.
383. See id.
384. See id.
385. See id.
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votes as members of the Security Council.386 In this context,
Zhou alluded to there not being a difference between permanent
members and temporary members when it comes to Security
Council voting,387 but this ignores the veto powers of the
permanent members.
On the effectiveness of the resolution of disputes by the
United Nations, Zhou noted that, while the rules regarding
dispute resolution in the UN Charter are obviously more
comprehensive and democratic than the League of Nations
Covenant, especially on the coherence between the aims and
principles, the execution of these rules in practice is a complete
failure.388
Zhou again criticized the United States for
manipulating the United Nations and worsening international
disputes in order to gain benefits for itself instead of actually
resolving the disputes.389 Zhou portrayed the UN’s solutions to
disputes as unjust and impractical.390 As a result, some of these
disputes turned into armed conflicts and even became excuses
for imperialist states to intervene in other states’ affairs or to
take military actions.391 For example, the discrimination in
South Africa that was raised by India in 1946, the conflicts
between Israel and Arab states since 1947 and the Kashmir
conflict in 1948 all escalated in this matter.392 For the Kashmir
conflict, the United Nations, under the manipulation of
imperialist states, allowed India to invade Kashmir and did not
take the advice of the implementing referendum, which left the
India-Pakistan conflicts unresolved.393
This Section has shown how Zhou’s International Law
engaged with the main topics and problems of international law
at that time by providing views based on his observations that
largely were unique from both PRC policies and Western
perspectives of international law, although Zhou clearly was
aware of both of these. Zhou limited the ideological statements
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

See id. at 783.
See id.
See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 784.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 784.
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about international law, which appears to have been typical
during that period within the Chinese international law
epistemic community. Zhou even was criticized by his editors
for his focus on Western bourgeois international law, as
contained in the preface to the 1976 version. All of these factors
suggest that Zhou’s International Law had significant scholarly
characteristics to it.
IV. Conclusion
As Edgar Allan Poe wrote, “The best place to hide is in plain
sight.”394 As alluded to in the introduction of this Article,
Hungdah Chiu asserted in 1987 that “no scholarly writings on
international law were published in the People’s Republic of
China” between 1965 and 1979.395 Numerous U.S.-based
international law scholars have repeated this assertion. This
Article has shown that there was at least one scholarly
publication on international law from the PRC during this time
period—Zhou Gengsheng’s book International Law. Therefore,
one can say that Zhou’s International Law has been hiding in
plain sight—hence the reference to “semisecret” in the title of
this Article, along with the fact that Zhou is well known among
PRC international law scholars. Indeed, Hungdah Chiu clearly
knew about this publication inasmuch as he wrote a review of
this work, as did two other Chinese commentators. However,
there is limited evidence that Western scholars have read these
reviews, given the lack of citations to these reviews, let alone to
the original source. Future publications will be left to surmise
why U.S.-based international law scholars ignored this source
when repeating Hungdah Chiu’s 1987 assertion, assuming those
scholars themselves do not respond to this Article. The
introductory portion suggested that Hungdah Chiu may have
ignored Zhou’s International Law because he saw a lack of
scholarly value in this work because it was too similar to
Oppenheim’s International Law and mirrored PRC policies
towards international law at that time. This Article has shown

394. Edgar Allan Poe, The Purloined Letter, in ELEONORA, THE FALL OF
(1917).
395. Chiu, supra note 1, at 1127.
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that Zhou’s International Law was an entirely different book
from Oppenheim’s International Law and that it varied
considerably from PRC policies towards international law on a
number of important issues, including his views on the custom
of premature recognition of an emerging state and allowance of
intervention on humanitarian grounds, as well as support for
the fight for independence of former colonies and issues of
migration of people with a particular race or nationality.
Moreover, this Article has shown that Zhou’s perspective on
international law actually was considerably progressive
compared to Western literature from that time.
Such
progressiveness underlines the work’s originality, although it
must be noted that progressiveness is not a requirement for a
work to be deemed scholarly.
In short, any reasonable
commentator in the 1980s with knowledge of Oppenheim’s
International Law, PRC policies towards international law
between 1965 and 1979 and Western international law
literature from that time period would have no choice but to
recognize the scholarly characteristics of Zhou’s International
Law, if not classify it all as a scholarly piece of work.
It is interesting to speculated on why erstwhile
commentators ignored Zhou’s International Law. Commentator
Gu Ming Dong employed the word Sinologism in 2013 to capture
how Western and Chinese scholars alike often mischaracterize
Chinese culture, not based on “obvious factors of
misinformation, biases and prejudices or political interference,”
but
rather
on
“epistemological
and
methodological
underpinnings that has become a cultural unconscious.”396 A
surprising number of members of the international law
epistemic community believe that the PRC was nonparticipatory or indifferent towards international law during the
Mao era,397 not just the late-Mao era and not just among PRC
396. MING D. GU, SINOLOGISM: AN ALTERNATIVE TO ORIENTALISM AND
POSTCOLONIALISM 1–2 (2012).
397. See, e.g., Syllabus of Thomas E. Kellogg & Anthea Roberts, China
and International Law, (Spring 2015) (on file with the author) (asserting that
China had an “ambivalent attitude towards many key aspects of international
law and the architecture of global order” during the Mao era); JEROME COHEN
& HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE’S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY
STUDY 14–22 (1974) (when discussing the post-1949 PRC approach to
international law, they only talked about either domestic law or foreign policy,
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international law scholars. This assertion has been made
notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence to the contrary that
the PRC actively has upheld the state-centered interpretation of
the international legal order, which focuses on state sovereignty
and non-intervention, inter alia. To be more specific, the PRC
appears to have employed a hybrid Marxist-Hobbesian-Kantian
approach to international law during the Mao era,398 an
approach that future publications will explore further. Suffice
it to say that such an approach is far from being nonparticipatory or indifferent towards international law, just that
the PRC did not blindly fall in line with Western notions of
international law, which tend to include democratic and liberal
not about international law per se); ANN KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: CHINA,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND GLOBAL SECURITY 62–64 (2007) (“China
initially showed little interest in, or respect for, the norms, principles, and even
rules of the international organizations it joined. It was only after 1978 . . . that
it began to reassess its interests in the light of organizational norms, to
acknowledge, if only in practice, the negotiability of its sovereignty, and to
accept the costs as well as the advantages of organizational participation. Most
important, it was only after 1978 that China learnt the importance of
reciprocal compliance as a foundation of international trust and cooperation.”).
398. See, e.g., FU CHU, RUSK’S ‘INTERNATIONAL LAW’ CANNOT CONCEAL THE
CRIME OF AGGRESSION AGAINST VIETNAM BY AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, IN PEOPLE’S
CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY LOC.1487 (Jerome A.
Cohen & Hungdah Chiu eds., 1974) (ebook) (building up the PRC’s role as
defender of international law in 1965); Shih Sung et al., An Initial
Investigation Into the Old-Law Viewpoint in the Teaching of International Law,
in PEOPLE’S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 31–32
(Jerome A. Cohen & Hungdah Chiu eds. 1974) (focusing on international law
and class struggle); Qiao Guanhua, The Speech of Qiao Guanhua: The
Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China to the UN General
Assembly [中华人民共和国代表团团长乔冠华在联合国大会上的发言], 13 RED
FLAG [红旗] 39 (1971) (calling for international peace by states working
together to promote sovereignty and independence); Lü Shilun, The Natural
Law in Service of Imperialism [为帝国主义服务的自然法学], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人
民日报（理论版)], June 29, 1963, at 62–64 (rejecting natural-law approach to
international law as an imperialist tool); Yang Xin & Chen Jian, Exposing and
Criticizing the Fallacious Reasoning of Imperialists on Questions Concerning
National Sovereignty [揭露和批判帝国主义者关于国家主权问题的谬论], 4 STUDS.
POL. & L. [政法研究] 6, 6, 15–16, 19–20 (1964) (focusing on limitless
sovereignty); Zhou Ziya, Talks on the Question of the Suez Canal [谈苏伊士运
河问题], 3 LEGAL STUDS. [法学] 35, 35–37 (1956) (justifying Egypt’s taking of
the Suez Canal in terms of international law); see also Speech, Xue Hanqin,
Speaker International Law in a Pluralistic World [多元世界里的国际法],
Statement on reception of Doctor of Law (Honoris Causa) (Dec. 17, 2014),
www.um.edu.mo (last visited Mar. 23, 2019) (alluding to all three of these
approaches in the context of the PRC’s approach to international law).
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values.399 Regardless, like the U.S.-based commentators who
repeated Chiu’s assertion that the PRC produced no
international law scholarship in the late Mao era, these
members of the international law epistemic community have no
obvious biases or reasons to provide inaccurate views about the
PRC’s approach to international law during the Mao era. On the
contrary, given their ongoing academic interests in the People’s
Republic of China, they have an obvious incentive to provide
views that are consistent with PRC policies, assuming they want
continued access to the PRC for their research purposes.400
Therefore, it seems easy to chalk these inaccurate views up to
the underlying “cultural unconscious,” as opposed to
“misinformation,
biases
and
prejudices
or
political
401
interference,”
as Gu Ming Dong explained. Although pure
speculation, it is possible that Hungdah Chiu’s downplaying of
PRC international law scholarship during the late Mao era in
general and the importance of Zhou’s International Law in
particular did not reflect a conscious bias against the PRC and
PRC scholarship, although it certainly was a possibility that he
harbored some biases.402 After all, Chiu was born in Taiwan,
399. For a discussion regarding some Western commentators’ somewhat
biased views of international law, see generally James D. Fry, Pluralism,
Religion and the Moral Fairness of International Law, 4 OXFORD. J. L. & RELIG,
393 (2014) (exploring Thomas Franck’s approach to understanding the moral
fairness of international law).
400. See, e.g., Carsten A. Holz, Have China Scholars All Been Bought?,
FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 2007, at 36, http://ihome.ust.hk/~socholz/HaveChinaS
cholarsAllBeenBought-FEER30April07.pdf (last visited June 14, 2019). To be
clear, this obviously is not to say that these commentators or other
commentators have been explicitly or implicitly bought or inappropriately
influenced.
401. GU, supra note 396, at 1–2.
402. Indeed, Chiu occasionally presented specious characterizations of
Mao-era international law scholarship. For example, Chiu wrote in 1989:
“During the Maoist era, not a single article devoted entirely to human rights
was published in China.” Hungdah Chiu, Chinese Attitude Toward
International Law of Human Rights in the Post-Mao Era, 5 OCCASIONAL
PAPERS/PREPRINT SERIES CONTEMP. ASIAN STUDS. UNIV. MD. SCH. L., 1, 3 (1989).
However, he failed to explain what was so important about having an article
“devoted entirely” to human rights when broader works addressed human
rights, such as Zhou Gengsheng’s handling of human rights in his 1963 article,
Keng-Sheng, supra note 28, at 54–62 (providing the English translation), not
to mention the reference to human rights in chapter 7 of Zhou’s International
Law, as explained above. Indeed, Soviet international law scholars never
devoted an entire article to human rights stricto sensu, and yet that has not
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taught there and served as Minister of State for Taiwan’s
Executive Yuan (cabinet) for a year,403 and it is no mystery that
the PRC and Taiwan have suffered from bad relations since the
Chinese Civil War.404 Nevertheless, Chiu’s downplaying could
have derived from his perception of the differences of the PRC
approach compared to the Western approach at that time, as
well as a mistaken belief that the Western approach was the
only valid approach. As Chiu wrote in 1972:
The Communist Chinese concept of unequal
treaties is flexible and broad. The Communist
Chinese consider this concept an important rule of
the law of treaties. According to their view, an
unequal treaty is invalid in international law.
Such a concept of unequal treaties does not seem
to have any support in the writings of Western
international law scholars.405
This quote shows how Chiu dismissed the PRC’s approach
simply because it differed from the Western approach, even
though the mainstream allowed for divergence in the form of
regional and national approaches through dualism and
stopped scholars from recognizing and taking seriously the Soviet approach to
human rights. See, e.g., Rein A. Müllerson, The International Protection of
Human Rights and the Domestic Jurisdiction of States, in PERESTROIKA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT ANGLO-SOVIET APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 62 (Anthony Carty & Gennady M. Danilenko eds. 1990).
403. See Ma Ying-Jeou, Tribute in Memory of Dr. Hungdah Chiu, 27 MD.
J. INT’L L. 1 (2012); Dongsheng Zang, China’s “Attitude” Toward Human
Rights: Reading Hungdah Chiu in the Era of the Iraq War, 27 MD. J. INT’L L.
263, 267–68 (2012) (describing Hungdah Chiu’s life); In Memoriam: Professor
Hungdah Chiu (1936-2011), DIGITAL COMMONS @ UM CAREY LAW,
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/chiu/?utm_source=digitalcommon
s.law.umaryland.edu%2Fchiu%2F3&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PD
FCoverPages (last visited June 4, 2019).
404. See generally STEVEN M. GOLDSTEIN, CHINA AND TAIWAN (2015);
RICHARD C. BUSH, UNCHARTED STRAIT, THE FUTURE OF CHINA-TAIWAN
RELATIONS (2013). Future researchers might want to explore the possible
biases inherent in Chiu’s opinions, in particular whether they reflect official
Taiwanese positions. The differences and animosities between the PRC and
Taiwan already have been well identified and analyzed elsewhere. Future
research might show that these political complexities between the PRC and
Taiwan were the main reason why Chiu downplayed or ignored Zhou’s book.
405. Chiu, supra note 80, at 239, 267.
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autopoiesis.406 Clearly Chiu adopted a more liberal approach to
international law than that of the PRC at this time.407 However,
that is no basis to entirely dismiss the PRC’s international law
scholarship from the late Mao era, which was then and continues
to be state centered in nature.408 After all, such an approach to
international law was then and continues to be the dominant
approach in general.409
The comparisons throughout this Article between
Oppenheim’s International Law and Zhou’s International Law
show that Zhou at least noticed Western descriptions of
international law and tried to respond to them. The Western
literature does not appear to have engaged with the PRC
literature in the same way, almost as if Western scholars felt

406. See generally GREIG, supra note 79, at 52–53; Leo Gross,
Autointerpretation In International Law, in 1 ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ORGANIZATION 383–86 (1984); TIMOTHY HILLIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 18 (1994); PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 63 (7th ed, 1997). For an interesting overview of the
different approaches to international law, see Martti Koskenniemi, A History
of International Law Histories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 943 (Barbo Fassbinder & Anne Peters eds., 2012).
407. See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 402, at 1, 39 (“Post-Mao China’s attitude
toward international law appears to be a relatively positive one. Never, since
the Communists came to power in China, has China shown such an interest in
international law. This changing attitude is the result of the new political and
economic policy of the post-Mao Chinese leaders, who are more interested in
modernization than world revolution. To achieve the goal of modernization, the
introduction of Western technology and investment into China is
indispensable. International law serves as a useful tool to facilitate such
intercourse between China and the outside world. This truth also explains the
reason why China’s interest in international law has now gone beyond the
traditional scope of international law and includes international economic law
and related fields.”).
408. See, e.g., XUE HANQIN, CHINESE CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORY, CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (2012);
Tieya, supra note 18, at 356; Xue Hanqin, International Law in a Pluralistic
World [Duoyuan shijie li de guojifa], Speech Given at the University of Macao,
Dec. 17, 2014, www.wells.org.cn/Article/ShowDetail/1378 (last visited June 14,
2019).
409. See HANS MORGENTHAU, THE POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 40 (1948);
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (3d ed. 1991); A. Claire
Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International
Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT’L STUD. 133, 133–
36 (2001); David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century:
History of an Illusion, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 99, 110 (1997); Mark W. Janis,
Individuals as Subjects of International Law, 17 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 61 (1984).
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that the PRC had nothing to contribute to the discourse. Jerome
Cohen astutely recognized this situation in 1972, justifying
Western scholars’ neglect of PRC’s positions on public
international law due to their “sweeping, ideological nature”
from the “crude generalizations [often being] based upon
allegations made by the executive or legislative branches of the
United States government, which continued to support the
PRC’s Nationalist rival in the Chinese civil war” and supported
by materials from Nationalist China.410 There certainly were
many international law pieces by PRC commentators that
contained such ideological generalizations. However, as this
Article has shown, it would be a mistake to dismiss all PRC
international law literature from this time period on this basis.

410.
Jerome A. Cohen, Introduction, in CHINA’S PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES 1, 1–2 (Jerome A. Cohen ed. 1972)
(“[I]t is surprising that there have thus far been so few studies of the twentyyear record of the People’s Republic (PRC) in international law”); see also
Jerome A. Cohen, Chinese Attitudes Toward International Law—and Our
Own, in CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES
282, 291 (Jerome A. Cohen ed. 1970) (“Plainly, if the process of integrating
China into the family of nations is ever to be completed, students of
international law will have to empathize rather than moralize, and give the
PRC’s words and deeds a fair hearing. It is not enough merely to quote Chinese
Communist statements, such as those asserting that the United States and the
Soviet Union dominate the United Nations, or that the United States has no
intention of disarming, as though these assertions carry their own refutation;
we should inquire in each instance to what extent there is evidence to support
the Chinese belief.”).
Cohen seems to have been the only Western
international law scholar to have publicly recognized the possibility that there
might be more to the PRC’s approach to international law during its early days.
His apolitical open-mindedness on these issues is to be commended.
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